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Chelsea Ngoc Minh Nguyen, Vietnam and China 2022-2025

Diplomatic developments

The year of 2024-25 has been politically intensive, historic, and ironic to Vietnam domestically and internationally. On April 2nd this year, when the US President, Donald Trump, announced a 46% tariff rate on major Vietnamese export products, Vietnam became the only country which he described as follows: “Great negotiators, great people! They like me, I like them. The problem is they charge us 90%. We’re going to charge them 46% tariffs.” Shortly afterwards, Peter Navarro, Trump’s trade policy advisor, came out in a televised interview with Fox News denouncing Vietnam as being “essentially a Chinese colony” which was “ripping and cheating us off” through its $125 billion trade surplus with the US. 

Although the Vietnamese government had expected to be hit by Trump’s unilateral and expanded trade war during his second presidential term, a tariff rate as high as 46% sent shockwaves throughout the country. This shock was partly rooted in how Trump’s first presidential term had become a source of rocketing economic optimism in Vietnam and “Trump-mania,” as characterised by widespread local admiration for Trump, his oligarchic values, and his containment policies against China. 

The initial shocks felt from Trump’s tariff war on Vietnam, as part of an escalated proxy war with China, disclosed a sense of local self-denial and called for a return to sanity and clarity. Public sentiments towards the tariffs have been dominated by disbelief, anger, and disappointment. Official and popular memories of the Vietnam War and revolutionary wartime nationalism have continued to rise ever since. An academic friend of mine, who researches Vietnamese memories of US chemical warfare and South Korean war crimes during the Vietnam War, expressed his rage on social media: “After waging a war on Vietnamese war memories, they are now waging another war against Vietnam 50 years later.”

Only five days after Trump launched his tariff war, the first country that the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, visited in 2025 was Vietnam. At the airport in Hanoi, Xi was received by Vietnam’s president, Lương Cường, and the Standing Secretary of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and Vietnam’s anti-corruption tsar, Trần Cẩm Tú. No such top-level airport reception of any Chinese leader had been given by Vietnam since 1991, the year when the China-Vietnam rapprochement took place amid the collapse of the Soviet Union. 1991 was also when Vietnam felt most vulnerable in the world and sought closer ties with China: when Vietnam proposed to China to resume an ideological alliance to salvage socialist internationalism, China rejected it. 

The top-level airport reception alone signalled that Vietnam is refusing US pressures to fundamentally turn away from China. In fact, similar dynamics already played out in 2023-24, when Vietnam was the only country in the world to receive the leaders of the US, China, and Russia. When Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden, visited Vietnam in September 2023, the US and Vietnam made the historic move to upgrade their relationship to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ (CSP). Excluding Laos, Cambodia, and Cuba, which remain Vietnam’s most important former ideological Cold War allies and which enjoy “a special relationship” category only reserved by Vietnam for these countries, the CSP is the highest-level categorisation of Vietnam’s hierarchy of diplomatic relations with the world. Previously, in 2021, when then-US Vice President, Kamala Harris visited, Vietnam initially rejected US pressures to upgrade their relationship to CSP; by 2023, the relationship had been upgraded.

To dilute the political significance of the US-Vietnam diplomatic upgrade, Vietnam also upgraded their ties with South Korea, Japan, and Australia to CSP in the same year. In the past, the CSP had only been enjoyed by China, Russia, and India. Therefore, its expansion represented Vietnam’s premature break  with high-level diplomacy confined to its former ideological Cold War allies. Nonetheless, shortly after Biden’s departure from Vietnam, Xi visited in December 2023. During Xi’s visit, Vietnam at last agreed to embrace China’s “Community with a shared future of humanity” following years of sustained Chinese pressure. However, in Vietnamese declarations, Vietnam continues to subtly refuse evoking the Chinese proposal’s other name, “Community of common destiny for mankind”. 

Cautious revolutionary re-kindling?

The fact that Trump launched a tariff war on Vietnam in April this year,  the month of the 50th anniversary since the end of the Vietnam War, served both as a historic and ironic reality for many Vietnamese. Coincidentally, before and after Trump’s tariff war was launched, Vietnam had already made many unprecedented moves in its political and military diplomacy towards its former Cold War allies. 

In August 2024, when Vietnam’s new communist party general secretary, Tô Lâm, visited China, he did something that had not been done by any Vietnamese leader since 1979: in Beijing, he paid respect at the Mao Mausoleum, while in Guangzhou, he paid respect at several former headquarters, bases, and memorials where many of the first generation of Vietnamese communist and patriotic revolutionaries, including Hồ Chí Minh (1890-1969) and Phạm Hồng Thái (1896–1924), operated or were sacrificed. This was a rare and open recognition of China as an indispensable political and geographical rear base to Vietnam’s 20th century revolutions. At the same time, in February this year, Tô Lâm became the first ever Vietnamese communist party general secretary to pay respect at the Vị Xuyên Martyrs’ Cemetery, where around 2,000 Vietnamese soldiers from the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979-1989) are buried. 

On April 30th this year, the date of the 50th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) marched for the first time ever in Ho Chi Minh City alongside the armies of Laos and Cambodia as part of Vietnam’s military parade for the occasion. Ahead of these celebrations, state media disclosed to the Vietnamese public for the first time ever the extent of past Chinese assistance during the Vietnam War, including the presence of over 300,000 Chinese military personnel in North Vietnam. Although Vietnam’s recognition of past Chinese assistance has been a standard diplomatic protocol since 1991, the move to disclose a specific number of Chinese military personnel present during the Vietnam War was unprecedented. 

On September 2nd this year, when Vietnam celebrated the 80th anniversary of its independence from Japanese and French rule, the PLA marched once again in Vietnam’s largest-ever military parade in Ba Đình Square in Hanoi, alongside the armies of Russia, Laos, and Cambodia. On this occasion, Vietnam’s Ministry of Defence also inaugurated the construction of a 3,000 square-meter park inside Vietnam’s new Military History Museum, commemorating past advisors and volunteer soldiers from the USSR, China, Cuba, Laos, and Cambodia. This park project had been “urgently” requested by Vietnam’s defence minister, state media reported.

These moves would have been impossible only a decade ago, when official and popular Vietnamese nationalism together openly targeted China. Back then, the competition between the party-state and discourses of popular Vietnamese nationalism, once shaped by liberal nationalist dissidents, intellectuals, and civil society, was about who stood for the most ferocious “anti-China patriotism”. Therefore, these latest moves signalled the Party’s increasing but complex internationalization of its official historiography of the Vietnam War, in which past contributions by other communist states, especially China, have become more openly and widely acknowledged. This also shows how the Party has become more confident in controlling popular anti-China nationalism and quelling historical narratives that challenge its official historiography of its revolution and wars. However, due to the lingering memories and legacies of the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979-1989), any official recognition of past Chinese contributions to Vietnam’s reunification and its politics remains a sensitive aspect of the Party’s official historiography and ruling legitimacy.  

Intra-party line struggles

Are these diplomatic shifts purely driven by external pressures from great powers? Many are already familiar with the historical and contemporary tensions between China and Vietnam on a wide range of issues. I would therefore like to dedicate some attention to the role of Vietnam’s domestic politics in recent years behind recent diplomacy. 

In 2024, in the months before and after the passing of the late communist party secretary, Nguyễn Phú Trọng (1944-2024), a dramatic power struggle took place: since the 13th CPV national party congress in 2021, six members of the original 18-member Politburo, the highest-level political body in Vietnam, have been purged, with four members purged only months before the passing of Nguyễn Phú Trọng. Two of them alone were incumbent presidents purged within a year. Many of the purged members were close to Nguyễn Phú Trọng. 

While Nguyễn Phú Trọng passionately advocated for Vietnam’s “Path towards socialism”, Tô Lâm, upon assuming the CPV leadership from August 2024, has rapidly replaced Trọng’s doctrine with his own slogan of Vietnam’s “Era of national rise”. Formal evocations of socialism have drastically diminished ever since. Moreover, these latest power transitions and struggles have given way to the public security and the military, two competing forces, to dominate Vietnam’s most important political leadership positions. 

This situation has amounted to an unprecedented take-over of the CPV leadership by the Party’s security arms, which represents a deviation from the CPV’s leadership structure which has historically been led by figures hailing more directly from a combination of ideological, party-building, and military work. This current situation stems partly from how the Party has become ever-more divided about the party-line on various issues, including on its ideological directions and foreign policy. While these divisions had already grown deep by the end of Nguyễn Phú Trọng’s second term in power (2016-2021), when he failed to promote his preferred successor to the CPV leadership, the divisions have only escalated since his sudden demise in July 2024. 

The Party has been unable to conceal these divisions. For instance, while Tô Lâm hails from public security, Lương Cường, the current president (2024 – present), hails from the military and it is he who has been mostly tasked with political work and party-building within the military throughout his life. At the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2025, Lương Cường was surprisingly seen accompanied by Major General Hoàng Kiền at a gathering of American and Vietnamese war veterans, which celebrated the acclaimed success of post-war reconciliation between the US and Vietnam. 

Since 2018, Major General Hoàng Kiền has been the face of a vigorous intra-party struggle that has been openly and vocally waged by prominent generals and war veterans. They do not regard themselves as dissidents, but rather as party members and sympathizers who struggle over what they believe should be the ideologically correct party-line. They commonly rail against the deepening US influence in Vietnamese politics and society, and against a growing sense of official deviation from socialism. They often accuse these processes of being facilitated by powerful segments within the party-state. They also advocate for increasing ties and solidarity with old Cold War allies as Laos, Cambodia, Cuba, Russia, and China. 

Up until 2024, these prominent generals and war veterans had mostly been silenced. Therefore, Hoàng Kiền’s presence at the UN with the President affirmed the growing influence and assertiveness of party “conservatives” within both the Party and the military. This has also become more manifest in the ever-rising popular online nationalism that increasingly targets the US, in part to exert pressure on Tô Lâm’s leadership.

For instance, amid the 79th Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, Tô Lâm toured the US and affirmed his support for Fulbright University Vietnam (FUVN), Vietnam’s first US-affiliated university based in Ho Chi Minh City, as a symbol of deepening cooperation between the US and Vietnam on education. Domestically, military-affiliated media fomented a large-scale online nationalist backlash against FUVN. These military-affiliated sources and their supporters accused the FUVN of negating the Party’s official historiography of the Vietnam War. Suspicions of the official historiography of the Vietnam War being changed and altered by the deepening diplomatic relationship between the US and Vietnam in recent decades has been the most long-standing subject of party-line struggle waged by prominent generals and war veterans in recent times. Shortly after the struggle against FUVN, however, military-affiliated media were forced to roll back on their nationalist campaigns against the university and instead  to express fondness about the deepening cooperation between the US and Vietnam on education. This episode disclosed growing rifts within the public security and military-dominated CPV leadership now in power.

The rise of red youth nationalism 

Public sentiments in Vietnamese society towards China and the US in the 2020s are drastically different from the 2010s. Throughout the 2010s, when liberal nationalist dissidents and intellectuals dominated public debates, many in the Vietnamese public and diaspora called for Vietnam to move towards a formal alliance with the US to contain China, especially in relation to China’s steady expansion into the South China Sea. The Party was often criticized for not moving closer and quickly enough towards the US. These years were marked by extremely high pro-US sentiments throughout society. Trump’s latest tariff war has even been regarded by some Vietnamese as an opportunity for “liberation” from China. 

Since 2020, the broader trend has nevertheless been that of rising red nationalism throughout society. Following Nguyễn Phú Trọng’s visit to China after the latter’s 19th Party Congress in November 2022, which was hailed by both the CCP and the CPV as a new “historical milestone” in the bilateral relationship, and with the ongoing ramifications of the Russia-Ukraine War reverberating widely, Vietnam has accelerated its rapprochement towards China and Russia while maintaining strong ties with the US. Red nationalism, which views the Vietnamese revolution and the leadership of the CPV overall more favourably than in previous times, has manifested especially sharply among Vietnamese millennials and Gen Z. This nationalism is both critical of and selectively embracing towards both China and the US. In this ambiguity, the 2020s contrasts greatly with the 2010s, when anti-party, anti-China, and pro-US nationalism once proliferated. 

And yet, the dramatic rise in red nationalism has not been monolithic in its ideological composition. Left-wing political discourses, activism, and solidarity campaigns by segments of Vietnamese Gen Z have emerged quite energetically in recent times. This has been especially triggered by the genocide in Gaza and the latest youth uprisings in Indonesia against capitalist inequalities. The ongoing Vietnamese youth activism against the genocide in Gaza is the first and most sustained practice of anti-war activism in Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam War. 

These emerging Vietnamese left-wing youths do not only question and criticize China and the US’ treatments of Vietnam, but they also question the party line on various political issues from both a class and national perspective. Unlike the more plentiful state-affiliated red young nationalists these days, who often adopt whatever position the Party endorses and implements, the red left-wing youths are evoking and re-invigorating Vietnam’s historical legacy of socialist internationalism. 

As part of my own research on the intimate afterlives of the Vietnam War and the Sino-Vietnamese War, as historical events that symbolize the politically violent transition from communist to intra-communist warfare, I visited a Chinese martyrs’ cemetery in the outskirts of Hanoi for the first time ever in December 2023. Beforehand, I had been cautioned by friends to not tell anyone that I had visited the cemetery. In fact, I found no written sign at the entrance of this cemetery which might have indicated that this is where around 40 Chinese martyrs from the wars against France and the US are buried. These enduring sensitivities remind me of the question a former member of Vietnam’s parliament once asked: “Vietnamese war veterans often meet with American and French war veterans. Why can’t such take place between the Vietnamese and Chinese war veterans?”

As scholars and students, we ought to bypass naturalised “enemy lines” through our own works and everyday lives, politically and empathetically. This is the silent message behind each incense I offered to the deceased and for the ideals that stubbornly continue to awaken us. 

Note: This was originally delivered as a talk at the Verso China Conference in London, October 2-4, 2025. We asked Chelsea to adapt and revise for publication on praxis, which she had obligingly done. RK & FL

 

Chelsea Ngoc Minh Nguyen is Postgraduate Student in Social Anthropology at the University of Cambridge

 

Nick Bartlett reviews I-Yi Hsieh’s Flora and Fauna

I-Yi Hsieh, Flora & Fauna: Domestic Nature and Private Collecting in Reform Era Beijing (Palgrave Macmillan, 2025)

“The Customer”, a prize-winning painting from 1990, depicts a middle-aged man holding a glass fishbowl. A young shopkeeper, family members and the budding aquarium hobbyist himself all appear transfixed by two goldfish swimming in the bowl at the center of the image. Judith Farquhar characterizes this artwork as an example of an “apolitical hobby” that replaced the epic depictions of collective labor favored by artists in Maoist China. I-Yi Hsieh’s delightful Flora and Fauna: Domestic Nature and Private Collecting in Reform Era Beijing (Palgrave Macmillan, 2025) offers a very different understanding of the significance of human and non-human relations forged in China’s “insect-flower-fish-bird” markets.

Hsieh’s book is, first and foremost, an ethnography of Old Beijing collecting (shoucang). The shop owners featured in this account do not belong to the wealthy urban elite or the migrant communities who are periodically expelled from the city. Instead, the congregation of connoisseurs who rent stalls in massive state-supported markets include former taxi drivers, grocers, handymen and others who hail from “down below” but nevertheless understand themselves as heirs to Old Beijing cultural history. In creating collaborative multisensory worlds with the help of goldfish, insect gourds, literati walnuts, and crickets, this group embraces the labors of breeding, tuning, feeding, and housing a range of non-human objects. The reward for excelling in these arcane pursuits is significant: connoisseurs who raise prized crickets emitting a refined hum that sounds like spring water can make hundreds of US dollars for the sale of a single insect. Hsieh, however, insists that these collectors are “obsessed” not with the money such business might bring, but rather, their commitment to cultivating multispecies milieu that serve as a shield against the harsh, frenetic environments they navigate in 21st century Beijing.

The book makes the case that documenting Old Beijing-inspired human-nonhuman relationships can help to dispel the Euro-American “natural order of things” that continues to insist on  a separation of nature and culture.  In conversation with the writings of Benjamin, Descola, Latour, Lefebvre, Mol, Merleau-Ponty, Munn and Winnicott, Hsieh works to destabilize purportedly universal categories. Her discussion of the collectors’ multispecies urban worldmaking engages two broad types of materialism—Marxist scholarship and recent object-oriented ontology—to elucidate collectors’ distinct set of ethical and ontological commitments. An accomplished curator as well as anthropologist, Hsieh’s theoretical agenda is complemented by the care and fascination with which she approaches these Beijing connoisseurs and their objects. Her vivid ethnographic descriptions of collecting practices are bolstered by the incorporation of Ming and Qing archival records, descriptions of street scenes, as well as the literary commentary of 20thcentury writers such as Lao She. The result is a compelling documentation of how the reconfiguration of objecthood offers practitioners new ways of situating themselves in continually transforming urban space.

Chapter Three, “Tanked Fish and Aquatic Happiness” offers a particularly powerful illustration of Hsieh’s project. The chapter starts with a vision of Chinese domestication that ties together “human, water, and fish as a system” (77). A dialogue between Zhuangzi and Huizi about the possibility of knowing “the happiness of the fish” grounds the subsequent exploration of the ecology required for the successful cultivation of prized red-goose head imperial goldfish in contemporary Beijing. In delineating the ecological system that supports this collective thriving, Hsieh moves from a discussion of the “metabolic labor” of the fish to the water-filled barrels preferred by prize-winning vendors, to the city’s distinctive centuries-old aquatic infrastructure. She then describes a visit to an urban village on the outskirts of the city where 187 breeding stations are staffed by migrant workers engaging in a painstaking labor of caring for the young fish that subsequently make their way to shops and collectors’ homes. The chapter powerfully conveys the appeal of“aquatic happiness” through domesticating nature in the city while revealing stark inequalities in the treatment of human workers who help to create and maintain this aesthetic world.

In the penultimate chapter, Hsieh shifts her focus from collectors to street performers. Initially celebrated as the freakish “Eight Great Marvels” in the last decades of the Qing empire, generations of performers have been subjected to shifting narratives and accompanying transformations to public spaces. In the Republic era, the performers were depicted as members of an abject lumpen proletariat before CCP media celebrated them as liberated workers in the first years of the People’s Republic. Today, wrestlers, xiangsheng comedy duos, dancers, and musical artists are feted as state-sanctioned ambassadors of the capital city’s intangible cultural heritage. Hsieh reads in their performances “historical hiccups” that unsettle their current status by revealing the historicity of earlier attempts to domesticate their marginalized traditions in China’s diverging projects of national becoming. The book culminates with a powerful critique of the contemporary “Chinese dream” as producing a chaotic and precarious existence for workers in the city that these worldmaking practices subtly subvert.

One nagging question I am left with after finishing the book involves the status of the feelings that the collectors and other figures in the text hold towards contemporary Chinese state actors. Despite Hsieh’s stated intention of avoiding an overly stark framing of Chinese citizens as “either collaborating with or resisting state power” (13), the book consistently insists that private collecting is an “implicit way of resisting” (101) and that expressive poetic worldmaking is one of “the only ways of being political within authoritarian censorship” (178). These characterizations don’t seem to allow for the possibility that collectors might hold a complex, contradictory feelings towards state actors. Silences that Hsieh reports exist among the collectors at certain points in her research might be less a direct fear of state reprisals than a hesitancy to articulate positions that diverge from those of the politically engaged Taiwanese anthropologist who is asking the questions. I was curious, too, about the relationships between the collectors and migrant laborers who supported their shops. These minor quibbles do not detract from the success of this exquisitely rendered ethnography of contemporary life in the capital. Moreover, Hsieh might respond by arguing that protecting a space for the “dialectics of self-making and world changing” in her account of Beijing collector aesthetic practices leaves open the possibility of making thecity a more inclusive, equitable place for all of its inhabitants.

Nick Bartlett is  Assistant Professor of Anthropology in the Department of Asian and Middle East Cultures, Barnard College

Work, Art, Life: Christopher Connery reviews Benjamin Kindler’s Writing to the Rhythm of Labor: Cultural Politics of the Chinese Revolution: 1942-1976

Benjamin Kindler, Writing to the Rhythm of Labor: Cultural Politics of the Chinese Revolution: 1942-1976 (Columbia University Press, 2025)

What would literature and art be like in a utopian socialist society?  There is a long tradition of thinking, prefigured in Plato, and in strong form in the Marx of The German Ideology, and in Marcuse, Adorno, and other members of the Frankfurt School, that there might not be any, that the aesthetic dimension would be inseparable from the everyday, that creativity could find expression in all social activity.   

Marx and Engels’s social vision of art under communism had been predicated on the transformation of the division of labor:

The exclusive concentration of artistic talent in certain individuals. and its consequent suppression in the broad masses of the people is an effect of the division of labor. Even if in certain social relations everyone could become an excellent painter that would not prevent everyone from being also an original painter so that here too the difference between “human” work and “individual” work becomes a mere absurdity. With a communist organization of society, the artist is not confined by the local and national seclusion which ensues solely from the division of labor, nor is the individual confined to one specific art, so that he becomes exclusively a painter, a sculptor, etc.; these very names express sufficiently the narrowness of his professional development and his dependence on the division of labor. In a communist society there are no painters, but at most men who, among other things, also paint.1 

There were strong intimations of this direction in the early years of the Bolshevik Revolution, in the work the Soviet futurists, constructivists, and fellow travelers.  Sergei Tretyakov, translator of Brecht and ally of the Chinese revolution (he lived in China in 1924 and was one of the Soviet authors of the “Roar China” poems), eagerly anticipated the end of artistic production.  As Boris Pasternak wrote, “The only consistent and honest man in this group of negationists was Sergei Tretyakov, who drove his negation to its natural conclusion. Like Plato, Tretyakov considered that there was no place for art in a young socialist state.”2  Tretyakov, Meyerhold, and many others of their persuasion died in the purges. The consolidation of Zhdanovism in the 1940s, enshrining socialist realism and the CCCP’s direction of cultural work, postponed the aufhebung of the aesthetic to the distant future.   There was more urgent political work to be done.   Katerina Clark and Evgeny Dobrenko characterize the purpose of and reason for writing in the Soviet Union of Lenin’s and Stalin’s era as an effort “to systematize reality – Bolshevik experience – and also to manufacture subjects.”

Christian Sorace has usefully described the PRC’s “discursive state”, wherein “state discourse is invested with the power of shaping reality in accordance with broader cosmological- ideological visions and normative models of behavior”.3 This generative power of discourse inheres in the literary as well, particularly in the programmatic days of literary production before the Reform period.  The systemization of reality and the manufacture of new subjects—one way to describe the CCP’s Zhdanovist ambition for literary production in the period from Mao’s Yan’an Talks through the Cultural revolution—acquires, within the ambit of the discursive state, greater salience than in Soviet Union.  The study of revolutionary literature, then, would offer insights not confined to the realm of culture, but into reality-generation itself.

Benjamin Kindler’s Writing to the Rhythm of Labor: Cultural Politics of the Chinese Revolution, 1942-1978 (Columbia, 2025) is in one sense a literary history, in that its focus is largely on literary works, roughly chronologically arranged, but as the title suggests, it sees literary production politically and philosophically, giving a privileged access to the architectonics of social and subjective construction.  Kindler is one of a small number of scholars publishing serious work on Chinese revolutionary philosophy—Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan in particular.  In Writing to the Rhythm of Labor, his periodization of literary production is at the same time a periodization of socialist construction at the level of politics and ideology, with its particular, and uneven temporalities.4  

Marx’s call for the overcoming of the division of labor was central to the Chinese revolutionary imaginary; this was one respect in which the Chinese revolution differed in emphasis from the Soviet predecessor, and the question of the division of labor is central to Kindler’s book.  Although the discourse of the Three Great Differences and their overcoming—mental/material, agriculture/industry, urban/rural did not become prominent until the late 50s in the commune movement, Kindler convincingly makes the problematic of mental and material labor central to his argument about the development of revolutionary literature from early 1940s through the 1970s, and with this emphasis takes us to the heart of what socialist transformation actually is.

Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s Intellectual and Manual Labor (first German-language publication 1970; English translation 1978), which has been undergoing a major revival in recent years due in part to the attention given by Slavoj Zizek, Alberto Toscano, and other contemporary scholars of “real abstraction”, consistently holds the Chinese Revolution as the living laboratory where the overcoming of this difference was firmly on the political agenda (though Sohn-Rethel was more interested in workers’ acquisition of technical and managerial knowledge, fostered in institutions such as the Cultural Revolution era’s Workers’ Universities).  Locating abstraction itself as a product of the antagonistic social division of labor between the mental and the material, Sohn-Rethel saw the overcoming of this division as the only genuine measure of a socialist classless society.   In his Introduction, Kindler sees a similar orientation toward this aufhebung of labor in the revolutionary feminism of He-Yin Zhen:

He-Yin Zhen’s demand for a universalization of labor marks the supersession of all those violent forms of bifurcation and difference that attend capitalist development and a recoupling of the universality of labor against the abstract form of universality that it assumes under capital, in which all forms of labor are rendered commensurable with each other under the wage form (14).

Labor, thus, would become coterminous with life, and the most politically significant cultural productions were those that engaged directly with the realm of the everyday. 

For writers to play a role in the transformation of labor and life, they would need, in terms Kindler elaborates from party theorist Zhou Yang, to “enter life”.  This entry into life was explicitly predicated on resistance to the division of labor, which meant that the position of the writer, or the writer as laborer, needed to be transformed at the same time agricultural society was being transformed into an “army of labor”.   The latter took, as Kindler acknowledges, non-socialist forms, building on cooperative modalities inherent in peasant life.  There were tensions in this project: “how to forge the otherwise fragmentary character of peasant labor into a collective body of labor power” (39), as well as the “uneasy relationship between the expanded productive power of collective labor on the one hand and its disciplinary power on the other”.   Disciplinary power commonly took the form of acceleration, and the period was full of exhortations against unproductive leisure activities—often gendered—and for an expansion of labor time. The disjuncture between the idea of the social transformation of labor power and the slow pace with which such transformations are actualized in real life creates temporal aporia which are reflected in the narratives.Kindler’s reading of Liu Qing’s 1947 novel, A Record of Sowing Grain, based on Liu’s practice of rural investigation during the cooperative movement, shows how the novel’s artificial and unsatisfactory external motivation for the transformation of rural social relations reflects the author’s—and the society’s—limited figuration of “life”: “At the level of content and form, the legibility of domestic labor would remain a challenge for socialist culture after this point, as well as the task of remaking ‘life’.” (47).  In Ding Ling’s fiction and reportorial work from the 1940s, however, the capacity for gendered affective sociality provides more fertile ground for the integration of “life”. Yet Ding Ling, like others, faced without final resolution the conundrum arising between the disjuncture between the lonely act of writing and the collective scene of social labor. Her famous line “I want to labor” was also a cry for the kind of transformation anticipated by Marx in The German Ideology

In the Yan’an period, the project of remaking life and labor was determined by its rural context.   The project of urban-based industrialization and the formation of a new working class brought the requirements of cultural politics closer to those of the Soviet Union.   This took institutional form in the summer of 1949 in the formation of what would become, in 1953, the Writers Association, a full-functioning ISA. The Writers Association combined the professionalization of writing with the persistence of the demand that writers “enter life”, i.e. industrial labor, but the terms of that entry could devolve easily into mere formalism.   The charge to make writing serve the formation and consolidation of the proletariat—Kindler’s second chapter is titled “Lazy Peasants, Productive Proletarians”—led to uneven results in literature, from the overly formulaic work of Zhou Libo to the more formally innovative work of feminist author Bai Liang. This chapter also treats the emergence of the worker-writer, an effort begun in the first half of the 50s under Ding Ling and others, and quickened in the second half of the decade, with the polemics around the newly emerged “amateur writer”, and debates about the extent to which a worker writer should remain connected to the scene of labor. Many of these discussions revolved around time: the time to write, and the productive use of that time. When time becomes the preoccupation of the state, however, that normally portends one thing: acceleration. This would of course become the salient dimension of the Great Leap period.

The literature of Great Leap acceleration included some formal innovations: an emphasis on the short or short short story, a form whose reading and production could be more easily integrated into the accelerating rhythms of labor. Of greater interest is the literary staging of waged labor and its connection to one of Kindler’s central thematics, that of “bourgeois right” (zichanjieji faquan). The discourse around “bourgeois right”, a theoretical consideration of the political/ ontological status of capitalist social and economic relations under socialism, revolved primarily around questions of unequally waged labor, but also around the political and class character of writers, whose insertion into the wage labor and pay-for-manuscript systems along Soviet lines was one source of questions about the class character of writing. The critique of waged labor, elaborated most forcefully by Zhang Chunqiao, represented the major departure from the Soviet model, and would grow in importance during the Cultural Revolution. 

The role of literature in the reproduction of socialism after the Great Leap takes shape within a complex and uneven temporality.  Kindler’s fourth chapter, “Reproducing Revolution: Cultural Reconstruction and the Aesthetics of Communist Heroism”, shows a double movement: a continued focus on the class character of writers and writing, and a re-professionalization of writing, which required greater urgency given the centrality of writing to the reproduction of socialism. The chapter begins with a close reading of a road not taken, in Ru Zhijuan’s 1960 short story, “All Quiet in the Maternity Clinic”, a text reproduced and widely discussed from 1962 on. The story’s setting within a maternity clinic—an actual scene of reproduction—was distinctive, but more so was its framing of the question of revolutionary continuity given the historical gaps between generations formed before and after the revolution. How, and by what means, was a revolutionary subject formed? The gendered complication of that question, evident in Ru Zhijuan’s story, gave way in mainstream 60s writing to a pervasive masculine version of revolutionary heroism. And as the struggle against Soviet revisionism took shape, amid more explicit warnings that the division between mental and material labor represented by the writer/ intellectual could be a dangerous locus of bourgeois tendencies, there was a more explicit effort to guide the political mission of literary work. Kindler notes that “[t]he visibility of the PLA as the locus of a struggle against bourgeois right provided the conditions for the promotion of selfless militarized discipline as a model for the transformation of the consciousness of labor, as well as being a model for the transformation of writing”. This orientation gave rise to the depiction of revolutionary heroes and models, and the various disjunctures that accompanied this prominence. A reading of Jin Jingmai’s 1965 The Song of Ou Yanghai shows how the novel stages the gap between heroic and quotidian temporality, but reaches its narrative resolution confined within the terrain of the heroic.  

On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, before a group of amateur writers, Zhou Yang declared that the amateur writer was the future of literary writing, and that the professional writer was destined to disappear entirely. With correct ideological and political leadership, writing would cease to be an individual affair and would “truly become part of the practice of the party, part of the revolutionary practice of the people and the masses”. (Zhou Yang, quoted on p. 175).  The burden placed on writers and writing was thus a great one, and one whose attainment, particularly given the limitations inherent to narrative construction itself, would be difficult to demonstrate. In the Cultural Revolution, the struggle against the literary scene as the location of bourgeois dictatorship reached an apotheosis, leading to the suspension of the Writers Association and the cessation of all state-sponsored cultural activity from 1966-1969. Kindler’s fifth chapter, “In and Out of Petersburg: Soul and Writing Under Late Maoism”, begins and ends with a discussion of the essay “Get Out of Petersburg”, where “Petersburg” is a metaphor for the literary and cultural ISA, viewed as a primary locus of “bourgeois right”. Though the ISA itself had been dismantled, the recrudescence of “bourgeois right” required continual monitoring.  Kindler’s chapter includes an extended and deeply insightful analysis of the thinking around bourgeois right, primarily through the successive versions of a textbook on political economy, whose final version appeared in September 1976. The textbook, starting with a consideration of the wage under capitalism and socialism, resulted in a picture of socialist society that was “a site of unevenness and as an ensemble of contradictions” (209). This unevenness placed unending demands on political work, since “the persistence of capitalist relations under socialism in the form of bourgeois right spontaneously produced ideological forces that themselves needed to be surmounted in order to transcend those capitalist relations… the restoration of capitalism was always imminent within socialist relations of production themselves”.    

A salient dimension of this uneven and contradictory scene was the theoretical recourse to “personification” (ren’gehua), whereby persons could be identified as “capitalist roaders” or revolutionaries. This had the potential to transform social relations into “problems of consciousness”, a politically ambiguous terrain. In Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, his study of the Cultural Revolution, psychoanalyst Robert Jay Lifton coins the term “psychism”, which involves a temporal short-circuiting of the social transformation process: “in its zeal to replace technology with mind, it tends to interfere with precisely the internal work necessary to accomplish real individual conversion and general social transformation…. the psychic work required for authentic inner change is in turn replaced by an image of the change having already taken place.5 In the terms of the bourgeois right discourse, this interiority is simply bourgeois subjectivity, and the wager of revolutionary literature was that the process of transformation could be taken up in other ways than an individualized, psychological framing of transformation. A common mode was the subgenre of the sent-down youth narrative. Kindler gives an extended reading of Zhang Changgong’s 1973 novel Youth, comprising a sent-down youth’s diary within a framing narrative.  Like other works of this nature, Youth stages its protagonist’s encounter with revolutionary models, an encounter that serves to figure the quotidian work of self-transformation. The diarist in Youth expresses that work as follows:

The advanced soldiers of the proletarian all have revolutionary tenacity.  Comrade Lei Feng praised the spirit of the screw, showing that in order to ram a nail into a board of wood, you need to rely on squeezing and drilling. Considering “squeezing” in terms of the problem of time: whenever there is the slightest free moment, it is necessary to occupy it with revolutionary content. Considering “drilling” in terms of one’s effort in work: any given matter requires repeated grinding, and constant initiative.” (182-183)

As Kindler writes, “the text, in these terms, comes to emerge as the site of multiple sites of copying and transcription” (183): textual processing as labor on the soul. The fruits of this labor, in the literature and theoretical work through the late Cultural Revolution, were figured in tropes of heroism, often mediated through texts or films, a heroism that inhered in the most quotidian dimensions of working life. Kindler ends his chapter with a reflection on the predicament created by the logic of personification: “these challenges could only be articulated in terms of psychic interiority, either in the form of a heroic subjectivity as the basis for the supersession of the wage form, or in the paranoid projection of writerly subjectivity as always already bound to the logic of capital.” (216) This is of course a different interiority from Lifton’s, but one that does not escape its political limits.

Alessandro Russo has suggested, though, that the image of the worker-hero had, as the Cultural Revolution progressed, lost considerable luster:

For the Maoists, a prerequisite for finding a new order was discovering how to remold the political role of the workers in the factories together with the entire state system. The rhetoric of the “marble man,” the “socialist labor hero,” the “model worker,” inspired by the Stakhanovism of the thirties in the USSR, was largely discredited by the events of 1966–1967, which revealed its disciplinary and anti-political nature. It was in fact used by the “loyalists” and by the Shanghai party authorities to quash the independent workers’ organizations. The canonical formula of the workers as “the masters of the state” remained empty propaganda if new forms of the relationship between worker and factory were not experimented with by going beyond the terms of the ordinary functioning of the “industrial danwei.”6 (Russo, 251)

The late Cultural Revolution reorganization of the factory, uneven though it was, was evident in initiatives such as the factory universities, as well as in the power of independent workers’ organizations, and the strengthening of workplace democracy in the late Cultural Revolution period, as documented by Joel Andreas,7 and these developments were somewhat at odds with the dominant trends of literary production.  Further research into unofficial publication might show evidence of alternative formal or subjective innovation.8

Kindler ends his book with a consideration of Ding Ling’s late (published 1978) Du Wanxiang, which he reads not in the context of the socialist hero bildungsroman, but as an exploration of the “time of communism”:

This is no longer a unified or synchronized temporality unified under the state, including in the form of the Writers Association as ISA, in the interests of a project of development, but rather in the mode of a disjuncture from the state, and in the inauguration of a long, stretched temporality, in which we pursue the cultivation of communist relations in the space of the everyday” (233)


Literary explorations of the time of communism persist after the end of the revolution, in China and elsewhere, albeit uncoupled from an ongoing revolutionary project.   In a development that might surprise those earlier advocates of the worker-writer, Zhou Yang’s amateur ideal, Chinese workers’ cultural production has over the last fifteen years flourished to a degree unprecedented in history. This has been not only on social media—the narratives, podcasts, musical performances and dance videos that fill Weibo, Kuaishou, Bilibili, and other platforms—but in a wide range of published fiction, testimonial, auto-ethnography, and poetry. The reader curious about the lives of the ubiquitous kuaidi delivery drivers, for example, could consult delivery driver Hu Anyan’s Wo zai Beijing song kuaidi (I do express delivery in Beijing)9 or one of Wang Erdong’s award winning poetry collections. Wang’s 2023 collection Gai zenyang jiang yige kuaijian digei ni (How to send an express package to you) is divided into four parts—collection, intermediation, transportation, and delivery—followed by a chapter glossing professional terms from the industry—packaging filler, electronic waybill, reverse logistics, et al –with short explicatory poems.10 This summer (August 2025), Zhang Sai’s Zai gongchang mengbudao gongchang: ruci gongzuo ershi nian (In the factory you don’t dream of factories: twenty years of work like this) was published to great acclaim in a prestigious literary series.11 Better known in the west are worker-writers such as Xu Lizhi (d. 2014), whose poems of the Foxconn assembly line acquired special poignancy after his suicide, and Fan Yusu, part of the group associated with the New Workers Literature journal based in Picun, Beijing, whose 2017 short memoir Wo shi Fan Yusu (I am Fan Yusu) became an internet sensation after her writing appeared on WeChat.  Wu Feiyao and Qin Shaoyu’s award-winning 2017 documentary Wode shipian (The verse of us) focused on six worker-poets, including Xu Lizhi, and stimulated a nationwide discussion of the “literariness” of worker poetry. The aesthetic debate was fairly uninteresting, due in no small part to the predictable wenren (intellectual) gatekeeping element. Although worker-writer production flourished, the movement to foster a worker’s culture, represented by Picun and a handful of other NGOs, had mostly collapsed by the end of the 2010s, victim to both state repression as well as developments internal to the groups themselves

Politically, the stakes in workers’ cultural production often centered on recognition, in some cases explicitly referring to the social status of work, labor, and cultural production in the socialist period. Here the effects were more muted. Although one of the most popular songs performed by the Picun New Workers Art Troupe, “Laodongzhe zan’ge” (Ode to the Laborers) had as a refrain a line often uttered by Xi Jinping, “laodong shi zui guangrong” (work is glorious), workers’ cultural production in the twenty-first century—whether tragic, humorous, reportorial, or sensational—just as one would expect, finds little glory or dignity in actual working life.  In its location within the everyday, though, this work holds open the space where the seeds of social transformation could sprout.

Christopher Connery, UC-Santa Cruz

 

Fabio Lanza reviews Sentimental Republic: Chinese Intellectuals and the Maoist Past

Hang Tu. Sentimental Republic: Chinese Intellectuals and the Maoist Past. Harvard East Asian Monograph Series. Harvard University Press, 2025. 326 pp. Hardcover $52.95

In Sentimental Republic, Hang Tu reframes the complex intellectual and political landscape of the post-Mao decades, shifting emphasis away from what he describes as “ideological” positions and focusing instead on the role of emotions. He asks, “How does emotion—as a constellation of affective intensities, moral sentiments, and political judgments—factor in the post-Mao political debates about China’s revolutionary past?” (3) Tu argues that, “By analyzing how rival memory projects stirred up melancholy, guilt, anger, and resentment, the polemics surrounding the country’s past cannot be properly understood without reading for the emotional trajectories of the post-Mao intelligentsia.” (8)

The book attempts to answer why “emotion” is a good entry into this material. Each of the five chapters is devoted to a set of intellectual/literary figures of the post-Mao era as well as a corresponding set of emotional attachments and sentimental approaches to the Maoist past. Tu moves from Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu’s differing conceptions of enlightened emotions, one based on pleasure the other on guilt (Chapter 1), to the elevation of the scholar Chen Yinke into a liberal martyr and a symbol of scholarship against politics (Chapter 2). Leftist melancholia is the topic of chapter 3, examined through the connection between Taiwanese writer Chen Yingzhen and Shanghai novelist Wang Anyi. Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to the “right” of the political spectrum and focus on conservative thinker Liu Xiaofeng and the neo-nationalists of the China Can Say No phenomenon.

Tu starts by postulating that previous scholarship has viewed the intellectual and political articulations of the post-1978 era as produced solely by “rational deliberation” or logically embraced political ideologies. That, in turn, has produced an artificial separation between the rational and the emotional, and reduced the debates of the 1980s and 1990s to “stark polarities: liberty versus equality, modern versus anti-modern, and forgetting versus remembering.” (13)  Against this backdrop of hyper-rationality, Tu proposes instead to analyze those various -isms not solely as the product of rational deliberation, “but also as sensorial, affective, and emotive utterances deeply informed by personal desires, shared feelings, and moral sentiments,” (15) in particular the feelings connected to the legacy and the memory of the Maoist revolutionary past.

This emotional-rational dichotomy is largely a straw man. Few scholars frame political positions as simply the result of “rational deliberation” or the appeal of political ideology simply in terms of logical choice. Even less is this true for the post-Mao period, where the emotional legacy of the past has loomed very large and of course has contributed to the political choices actors make. So why does Tu need this false dichotomy? Postulating a fake dichotomy between reason and emotion, ideology and feelings, Tu successfully removes politics – as collective practice, shared experience, and communal ideation – from the post 1978 debates. He thus successfully depoliticizes not only the post-Mao era but the Maoist revolution itself. If mass politics is the site of irrational passion, depoliticizing allows historical actors to be rationally emotional without being political. And in that, Tu’s re-proposition of the emotion-rational dichotomy reprises its long and fraught history in Cold War orientalism, when it was deployed to separate the logical, democratic, appropriately thoughtful West and the irrational, emotional, and unruly East.

As Tu states, throughout the book, “Mao’s revolution” serves as “a generic term to designate a constellation of sociopolitical events, values, and memories” (4). Maoism is described as a quasi-religion, as brainwashing, as trauma, and Tu also repeatedly mentions something called the “Maoist sublime,” without ever explaining what that might have been.  This is a way to erase the complex historical experience of the Chinese revolution and to empty that experience of any political significance. This is most evident in the first chapter on Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu, who famously and explicitly bid “farewell to revolution.” Tu uncritically espouses Li’s concept of “the double bind of enlightenment and national salvation” (30) and accepts the completely ahistorical view that connects May Fourth iconoclasts to the children of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, who “both sought a ‘cultural-intellectualistic approach’ to political ills, fueled by ‘obsession with youth’ and “destruction of the past.” (47-48). The decades-long Chinese revolution is flattened by erasing any historical difference (1919 becomes 1966) and by reducing politics to irrational youthful emotions and destructive feelings.

Tu actively embraces Li’s politics of depoliticization, even when he cites the Chinese New Left’s criticism of Li and Liu’s thesis “as a thinly disguised neoliberal schema to ‘depoliticize’ radical thinking and legitimatize ‘end-of-history’ liberal triumphalism.” (47) Interestingly for a book about the debates of the post-Mao era, the New Left is left to haunt the books as a specter, appearing here and there, usually as a critical voice, only to be dismissed and banished to oblivion. Indeed, any direct engagement with the Chinese New Left would require taking the politics of the Maoist revolution seriously as politics, and not only as memory, trauma, or emotional attachments.

Does Hang Tu consciously adopt the politics of depoliticization and Sentimental Republic? I cannot say. But with the excuse of recovering an emotional dimension to post-Mao China that nobody actually has ever denied, Tu effectively flattens historical complexities into a story about the passions of a few individuals. To be clear, there is nothing wrong in an approach that centers affects and emotions, and there are excellent histories of emotions; here however, this approach serves mainly to produce a simplified and depoliticized depiction and to reduce profound political and intellectual differences to emotive responses. It’s all about the vibes.

In addition to the flaws in the main argument and analysis, I also want to highlight a glaring omission: Tu does analyze the work of one female writer, Wang Anyi, but he does so only through her relationship with Chen Yingzhen. That relationship developed after their participation in the 1983 Iowa writing program. Curiously, nowhere in the book does Tu mention that Wang went to Iowa with her mother, Ru Zhijuan, an important writer and editor in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s; nor does he mention that Wang and Ru wrote a memoir together about that trip. In a book ostensibly about the political memory of the Mao period, this critically relevant source is never mentioned. Instead, Wang Anyi’s approach to the revolutionary past is refracted through her relationship with the (male) Taiwanese leftist, Chen Yingzhen.[1] To be sure, this was a crucially influential relationship, but Wang and Ru’s own words, which are available, are absent. The silence about Wang and Ru is quite significant, especially in what is already a male-centered book.[2]

This review was originally commissioned by Twentieth-Century China, but it was rejected (in a slightly different version) as too harsh and straining “the bounds of collegiality.”

Notes

[1] Carlos Rojas, “Mothers and Daughters: Orphanage as Method,” Chinese Literature Today, Volume 6 (2017) https://doi.org/10.1080/21514399.2017.1375283

[2] Tu’s evident neglect of gender issues is on display again, for example, on p. 3, where he labels the speech of the famously emotional Chai Ling on the eve of the June Fourth massacre as “hysterical.”

P. Kerim Friedman, Yes, “Taiwan Can Help,” but not if it continues to ignore Palestinian voices

On July 6th, according to a report by Jordyn Haime in the South China Morning Post, Taiwan’s official representative to Israel, Abby Ya-Ping Lee, pledged to support a medical center in a settlement community in the occupied West Bank. After the report became public, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) told United Daily News that the matter was still under discussion and that funds had not yet been promised. That is fortunate, because if they had, it would be a gross violation of international law as well as international norms.

It would not be the first time that Taiwan and Israel found themselves standing together in defiance of these norms. During the Cold War, Taiwan was paired with the apartheid states of Israel and South Africa as a trio of “pariah states.” South Africa and Taiwan have since shed their authoritarian pasts, emerging as liberal democracies. They have also each undertaken a process of transitional justice in order to reckon with these histories. But while South Africa has extended that reckoning to the international arena, accusing Israel of apartheid and leading the charge against Israel’s genocide at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Taiwan has limited its own version of transitional justice to domestic politics.

As a result, Taiwan’s Cold War legacy still haunts its international relations, leaving it unable or unwilling to speak out against the genocide in Gaza, even as it offers support to Ukraine against Russia. As an American Jew who is also a Taiwanese citizen, I have repeatedly tried to speak out against this silence. I would like for my fellow Taiwanese to be confident enough in their place on the world stage, in the vibrancy of their culture, and in their democracy that they could find the voice to support the Palestinian cause. Instead, I find Taiwan seemingly willing to break international law in order to provide direct support to the occupation.

Why this disconnect between Taiwan’s stated values and its behavior in the Middle East? Some possible answers suggest themselves. One is that Taiwanese see Israelis as kindred spirits. They see in Israel’s ability to stand up to its Arab neighbors a model for their own struggle against China. There is also a pragmatic angle: like Israel, Taiwan is dependent on US military support and weapons sales to protect their border. They dream of a Taiwanese “Iron Dome,” even though it would be unlikely to work against China.

But there is another reason as well. Anthropologists talk about a process called “schismogenesis,” by which groups seek to differentiate themselves from rivals by taking up contrary cultural practices and political alignments. Think of the Yooks and the Zooks in Dr. Seuss’s The Butter Battle Book: one eats their toast with the butter on the top, the other with it on the bottom. I think something like this has hurt support for Palestinians in Taiwan. If the Chinese are for it, the logic goes, then Taiwan must be against it. While it is true that China has been a vocal supporter of a ceasefire, and has helped broker an agreement between Hamas and Fatah, the reality is far more complicated, given China’s long-term, close relationship with Israel. Chinese tech firms are involved in the surveillance of the occupied Palestinian territories, deploying technologies that were first tested in East Turkistan, as part of policies that were, in turn, inspired by Israel

Unfortunately, such complexity gets lost in Taiwanese discussions of the matter. One can laugh with netizens who scoff at China’s support for Palestinian sovereignty, asking why they don’t support a “two-state solution” for Taiwan and China? But such a framing has the effect of erasing Palestinian voices from the discussion. The idea, put forward by one opinion writer, that China and Hamas have formed an evil and mutually beneficial alliance is not far outside mainstream discourses in Taiwan. A MOFA official went so far as to suggest that Haime’s story was deliberately timed to undermine Taiwanese sovereignty because it was published on the eve of a pro-Taiwan statement by the Israeli parliament. 

This obvious effort at deflection should give Taiwanese pause. It is reminiscent of how the  anti-imperial left in the US downplays Taiwanese voices when talking about cross-strait relations, reducing everything to a power play between the US and China. “Policide” refers to efforts intended to destroy or deny the existence of a political entity. It is what China is trying to do in Tibet, East Turkestan, and Taiwan, and it is what Israelis are trying to do in Palestine. Just as wearing a keffiyeh or a watermelon pin is an actionable offense on US college campuses or at work, so too is waving a Taiwanese flag at the Olympics or anywhere in China. Both countries are victims of efforts to suppress overt symbols of their sovereignty. Similarly, when pundits and politicians flatten geopolitics to a great game between world powers, they aid and abet this process of policide. Taiwanese should think twice before participating in such erasure.

True, one should be careful not to exaggerate the similarities. Taiwan is a highly functioning, democratic state with a thriving economy and de facto political relations with most of the world’s nations, while Palestine is under direct military occupation, divided between two geographic entities (Gaza and the West Bank), each with different ruling bodies, and even during times of relative peace can hardly be said to function as a truly independent state. Despite that, China has actually been much more successful in restricting expressions of Taiwanese statehood than Israel and America have been able to do with regard to Palestine. 146 out of 193 nations recognize Palestine, while only 13 UN states (and Vatican City) recognize Taiwan. 

The success of such policide in the international arena is concerning because it is laying the groundwork for something much more violent, just as the policide of Palestine makes possible the continued genocide in Gaza. The related term, “politicide,” refers to the genocidal destruction of the people associated with a political entity. Politicide does not always follow policide, but policide can certainly make politicide easier. The Palestinian exception to free speech enables the genocide, just as denying Taiwan a seat in the UN makes it that much easier for China were it to decide to take the country by force.

Taiwan’s exclusion from the World Health Organization (WHO), a form of policide enforced by China, became a major issue during the COVID crisis. In response, Taiwan used its excess capacity in producing personal protective equipment (PPE), as well as its effective pandemic response experience, to promote itself as a “force for good in the international community.” They even coined the slogan “Taiwan can help.” Viewed in this light, MOFA spokesman Hsiao Kuang-wei’s蕭光偉 claim that donations to settler hospitals are simply part of Taiwan’s ongoing strategy of providing humanitarian medical aid is almost understandable. That is, until you realize the context. In 2024 the UN International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory “not to render aid or assistance to illegal settlement activities, including not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connection with settlements in the occupied territories.” Although Taiwan is not a member of the UN, it does generally seek to respect international legal norms, and it seems clear that financial assistance to the Nanasi Medical Centre at Sha’ar Binyamin would be in violation of those norms.

The “Taiwan can help” slogan was designed to fight against Chinese policide of Taiwan which, among other things, excludes Taiwan from a seat at the World Health Organization. So it is ironic, to say the least, that this very same policy would help serve Israel’s politicide of Palestinians in the West Bank. How can Taiwan hope to be seen as a “force for good” when it undertakes such actions against the backdrop of the ongoing genocide in Gaza? Taiwan needs to stop acting as willing participants in Israel’s policide of Palestine. Silencing Palestinian voices will only hurt its own battle to be heard over Beijing.

P. Kerim Friedman (傅可恩) is a professor in the Department of Ethnic Relations and Cultures at National Dong Hwa University(NDHU) in Taiwan.