Sabu Kohso, Japan’s Actual and Virtual Fascism — Reading Archaism and Actuality by Harry Harootunian

What does it take to keep company with the social formation of a distant nation by closely examining its internal discourses striving to evaluate the course of capitalist modernization that imposed catastrophic changes on the lives of inhabitants? What does it mean to grasp their dispositions with a language capable of comparison and introduce them to the global arena of critical thinking? Answers to these questions are what Harry Harootunian has shown us through his life-long dedication to history. His research field is the nation-state called Japan and his comparative language is global Marxism. His recent book Archaism and Actuality —Japan and its Global Fascist Imaginary (Duke University Press, 2023) is a pivotal achievement in the encounter he sets up between the two. Fully employing his philosophy of historical time, Harootunian reveals an unspoken mechanism internalized in Japan’s national mobilization, functioning throughout  the capitalist development that formed both authoritarian and liberal regimes of the past and of today.

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Archaism and Actuality assembles three phases of Japanese modernity that have been  cornerstones of Harootunian’s efforts in reading and decoding internal discourses: the Meiji Restoration (1868), the interwar years (1920s and 1930s), and the post-WWII era (after 1945). The assembly traces his intellectual formations in a concentrated manner. These are also the critical junctures that rendered a radical regime change in different registers, but equally marked a return of a zeitgeist affected by archaism. It is important to stress that the regime changes always came along with massive violence — of civil war, imperialist expansion, and world war. As the embodiment of his critical stance towards the linear view of history, Harootunian refuses to arrange the three phases into a chronological narrative, but treats them as independent layers of events, coming to the surface in resonance like “palimpsests” with his gaze cast from our present, namely, this dark time of permeating genocidal war, authoritarian governance, institutionalized discrimination, and environmental degradation.

The problematic kernel that experiences of archaism internalize is fascism — its discursive formation from premonition to apparition, from virtual to actual forms. For Harootunian, fascism is “the measure by which capitalism saves itself from the crisis it causes”; for opportunistic resolution, the agency of crisis ridden-capitalism — be it totalitarian state or dictator or mercenaries — seeks to mobilize the populace around nation’s mythological origin toward a regime of fanatical worship and submission. In its universal definition, “fascism is a total rejection of history by archaism.” In this sense, archaism functions as an internal device of capitalist nation-states to modify themselves into authoritarian states at any moment they confront irresolvable fissures. As far as Japanese experiences are concerned, the archaism cannot be thought of without the emperor system and variant ways it was made to return in three phases for unequivocally compelling the divine authority for national amalgamation.

Thanks to Harootunian’s exceptional passion in reading the Japanese écriture that radically shifted during modernization, the actualizations of archaism are vividly traced through the local texts of a number of late Tokugawa scholars and activists, such as prewar philosophers Hasegawa Nyokanzen, Miki Kiyoshi and Tosaka Jun, and postwar thinkers such as Maruyama Masao, Kobayashi Hideo and Takeuchi Yoshimi — in reference to the theories of Karl Marx as well as prominent Marxist philosophers such as Lukács, Gramsci, Benjamin, and several contemporary theorists. In this way, the book provides the English-speaking world with Japanese archaism as an unconventional reference for confronting rising fascism across the world today.

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Harootunian employs Japan as an intellectual weapon with a double-edged sword, as it were. This Japan embodies a singular disposition of problems it developed during its hasty modernization that was necessitated to counter the interventions of Western colonialism; the singularity is then introduced as attestation to undo the universalized progressivism of a Western master narrative. At the core of the progressivism reigns the linear view of history — to see progress of historical time in stages that  all nations are destined to follow in their course of becoming a mature capitalist society that would also conceive a socialist revolution. The historical fatalism is inherent in modernism or more precisely modernization theory, that affected not only liberalism but also Marxism and haunted revolutionary movements in developing countries including Japan. As Harootunian refers to in this volume as well as elsewhere, there was a series of debates on the status of Japanese capitalism among local Marxist scholars and revolutionaries roughly between 1927 and 1937, that had been triggered by the Comintern’s directive insisting on the need for a two stage revolution: first a democratic revolution to oust feudal landowners (and the emperor as their epitome) and then a socialist revolution to overthrow the bourgeoisie. The debates contributed little to the benefit of popular struggle even if they prepared an enrichment of sociological analyses of the nation amid capitalist development.

Discourses on Japan tend towards its culture rather than socio-political struggle. Harootunian has been an adamant critic of this trend. For him, the nation is nothing less than a site of historical disquiet like any other, that is the actuality glossed over by cultural representation. Beginning from the bubble economy of the 1980s, the country conspicuously became an object of strange attraction as a hotbed of cultural commodities — from Zen temples to fanatical consumerism to anime imageries. It was perceived as a fantasy world where archaic remnants, urban sophistication, and dystopian futurity could coexist. The postmodernism debates in Euro-American academia selected the nation as an epitome of “post-historical society” (Alexandre Kojève), wherein an endless game of signs would continue without the interference of historical events. In such a reception, Japan is reduced to an aestheticized and mystified object rather than treated as an ethico-aesthetic field of inquiry. What this reception overlooks are the fangs inherent in the seemingly pacified nation-state. And if there is an inclination of Japanese society itself that encourages this reception, that is precisely a trickery of what the book tackles in terms of archaism as a spiritualization of the political, whose most enduring embodiments have been the emperor and imperial family that today play a symbolic role to sustain an implicit nationalism in the highly commodified society by repetitiously appearing in the media with their pacified and mysterious presence.

Harootunian’s critical stance against the hegemony of the linear view of history and the culturalist view of Japan resonates with his doubts about a major trend of Western Marxism. A wide range of cultural analysis has flourished in Euro-American Marxism, beginning from the generalized influence of the Frankfurt School and most explicitly in the boom of cultural studies. This trend has been reinforced by a view of the world centered on the observation of developed countries, that considers commodification of the world as having been completed and insists on the reality facing real subsumption rather than formal subsumption. In the relationship between the two modes of subsumption, although the former could be surpassing the latter in an overall tendency, the relationship varies according to place and situation. When the tendential analysis is made into a manifesto, the strategic precedence of movement tends to be given to the domains of urban culture (information, representation, and intellect) rather than those of body, place, and everyday life in the periphery. For Harootunian, the determinism of real subsumption is “complicit with capital’s own representation.”

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Archaism and Actuality provides a panoramic view of the conflicting discourses that arose during Japan’s much troubled modernization, which, Harootunian argues, invited apparitions of archaism in three modes. The panorama of palimpsest depicts three present-times or conjunctures that consist of their own layers of events, which are seen also through the discourses that appear in other phases. Such multi-referential assemblage is based on Harootunian’s philosophy of historical time, that begins with a reconsideration of formal subsumption, that is, the structural relation between the direct and indirect commodification of labor, or between life and nature in varying modes and degrees according to geographical and temporal orders. His point is in the fact that “capital takes whatever it can use” for its reproduction and expansion, therefore the everyday life of commoners — the basis of all — consists of a complexity of overlapping effects of equivalent form, from workplace to home to public space. Incorporating Marx’s “uneven and combined development” and Benjamin’s “now-time,” Harootunian shifts strategic attention for grasping the world from a chronological linear time to a multiplicity of present times.

The power of the book largely derives from the historian’s expertise on the late Tokugawa discourses, that developed with the impetuses toward the Meiji Restoration (1868) as a complexity of events. What Harootunian’s readings of the discourses reveal is almost a state of overdetermination by numerous contingencies, that led to the end of Tokugawa Shogunate with the opening of ports to global trade after three hundred years of the closed-nation policy, and finally the Meiji Constitution (1889) with the Emperor’s absolutist rule —of a human god — as a restitution of the archaic, which established the matrix of virtual and actual fascism for the following regimes of modern Japan. The constitution was unique in that it relied on a mythic origin, instead of appealing to a concrete historical past as a guide to the present, like the Roman Empire for ”the West”. It was the beginning of unfinished processes, that set the ensuing courses of Japan’s modernization, wherein numerous impetuses that created this event disappeared from the political stage; and some of them, once submerged, survived and reemerged in the newer contexts. One of the most crucial lessons we learn from the book is a trick of the complexity of historical time.

The factors that gradually drove out Tokugawa rule included the emergence of manufacturing or industrialization, the pressure of Western colonialism, the rising power of southern domains, the subversive acts of lower class samurai, and the popular rebellions such as peasants’ uprisings, urban riots, mass hysteria (street dancing and pilgrimage), millenarist movements (new religions and communitarian withdrawals), and so forth. Harootunian presents these events that led to the Restoration almost as a festival of molecular movements—of militant scholars, fanatical patriots, and popular insurgencies—rather than sagas of heroes who sacrificed their lives for the realization of present democratic nation, a narrative that dominates the common view of the Meiji Restoration among the Japanese today. For Harootunian, these conflicts have  not ended, but rather, they persist in ongoing problems of the capitalist nation-state. Most importantly, he considers the popular rebellions as a creation of “new subjectivation” that ensured unprecedented calls for equality and placed a new value on the land to be cultivated by the peasants themselves — whose distant trace would come to be seen in the Sanrizuka farmers’ struggle against the Narita Airport construction in the late 20th century.

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Harootunian’s analyses of the political events of the three phases is guided by Antonio Gramsci’s concept: “passive revolution,” that is, for the historian, the form of political practice corresponding to economic “unevenness.” When an attempt to change a regime does not have a hegemony as powerful as the Jacobins in the French Revolution (1789~1799) — that was in fact an exceptional case that realized a total destruction of the regime — the agency has to rely more on itshistorical inheritance (institutions of the past) than their new arrangements, and the process of change tends to be gradualist or reformist or possibly captured by a setback of authoritarianism. In other words, any revolution must borrow certain experiences from its own context, but this process always involves dangers to stall, or in the worst case, it would be taken over by the group that desires the outright retrogression of time — the advent of fascism. Harootunian thus emphasizes the temporal dimension in his conceptualization of passive revolution and develops interpretations of the three phases as processes of borrowing the temporalities of the past — each of which nurtures the moment of anachrony or the mythological time of archaism at its core.

During the interwar years (the 1920s and 1930s), Japan mutated from being a victim of colonialism to a colonizer at large. Amid imperialist expansion across the Asian Continent, the nation-state was experiencing accumulating  internal problems. While enjoying a cosmopolitan atmosphere in the flourishing urban culture of the 1920s, global trade served only capital and the state, while endangering commoners’ subsistence and ways of life. In the 1930s, commodification saturated Japanese society; capitalist developments threatened the integrity of rural communities and the traditional family. As Harootunian points out, the everyday lives of populations were now determined by the repetitious time of the workday and lost the concrete time they had long sustained. In this atmosphere, the archaic that emerged from the recesses of a noncommodified precapitalist era provided a hedge against alienation in a broad sense.

In his analyses of this phase, Harootunian renders discursive conflicts that occurred among varied tendencies (communists, socialists, liberals, conservatives, and fascists) and categories (philosophy, history, sociology, and literature) as a complex scheme of interactions. The discourses, from left to right, sought to make sense of their present problems derivative of the capitalist modernization that had begun with the Meiji Restoration. While the right tended toward a realization of national integrity and empowerment as the unfulfilled mission of the Restoration, the left hoped for a realization of progressive modernization by ousting feudal remnants. Importantly, Harootunian is keen to point out the areas of their overlap. In other words, these discourses relied on or were captured by the linear view of history — either to push it forward or retrovert it — both being motivated by their antagonism against the enlarging influence of financial or oligarchic capitalists. In this mode, Harootunian proposes critical readings of the discursive conflicts among the positions in a spectrum of passive revolution. Highlights in his readings are the singularity of Japanese archaism as fascist ideology and the theory of the Marxist philosopher Tosaka Jun.

The ideology of Japanese fascism (called “Japanism”) tended toward the nation’s divine origin —  mythic time— in contrast to the historical time of Mussolini’s Romanness or Hitler’s thousand-year Reich. The difference was that the archaic as a reference to a distant time was mutated —or primitivized — into the archaism as a timeless ideology without history or place. In this way, the ideology of Japanism attempted to conceal the contemporary temporal order of capitalism by installing an ideal image of primitivistic family system epitomized by the imperial household. Thus, the primitivization of the archaic functioned as “an ideological masquerade” that circulated “like the commodity form and penetrates every nook and cranny of society and culture.” Meanwhile, the political goal of Japanese fascism (toward “the Showa Restoration”) was technically to promote the imperialist expansionism driven by a monopoly capitalism of large industries, but paradoxically its discourse advocated a re-feudalization toward farming communities. It sought to establish the authority of a fusion of soldiers and farmers with the slogan of recovering rural community and family integrity of lower and middle classes — of folk but not proletariat.

The philosophy of Tosaka Jun appears as an immanent critique of the discursive arena of this phase. His project of dissecting “Japanese ideology” was, for Harootunian, “an abstraction capable of encompassing the entirety of social formation.” This was also an attempt to grasp the materiality of history, namely, “how the present was situated in a historical time contemporaries were living.” Here “the historical” meant the lived reality of the time of the proletariat, the principal agent of history. The central concern in this formulation was “the everyday which was being left behind by the failure of capitalism to fulfill the aspirations of the present and change its course.” Harootunian’s analyses of Tosaka’s philosophy synchronize the historian’s own conviction of practicing history, wherein the everyday is “a microcosm representing the whole of history.” With Tosaka, Harootunian believes that “the present as the realm of necessity must be the starting point for the rehistorization and actualization of all pasts in the present moment.” Thus, the everyday is the starting point of our struggles for liberation. 

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The postwar era began with Japan’s unconditional surrender to the Allied Forces, ending WWII in 1945. The original planning for the postwar constitution was initiated with the intervention of American ambition to create a democratic society, that Harootunian associates with “Dr. Moreau’s island laboratory,” but America’s own problems and the war in Korea prevented fulfillment of this ambition. As a consequence, a large part of the power that had driven fascist Japan, including the emperor, was exempted from the trial for war crimes and resuscitated by the judgement of the American Occupation. This was necessitated by its strategy to confront the new enemies in Asia by making the Japanese Archipelago a frontline base. Without the participation of the people in the country, the postwar constitution was thus established putting the emperor back on his throne — though no longer as absolute monarch but national symbol. This speaks to the fact that the American Occupation had a clear recognition of his role for national amalgamation.

In this way, the use of the emperor as archaic apparatus was restored yet again in the third phase. In citing the words of the critic and sinologue Takeuchi Yoshimi, Harootunian stresses: now the emperor functioned as “a kind of metonym of Japan calling attention to the totality.” In the new society which would become an economic giant, “miniature emperor systems were embodied in every blade of grass and tree-leaf of Japan.” In liberal capitalist society, too, the emperor continued to be an ideal tool for an imaginary recovery of all that is lost in the process of capital’s accumulation. Which means that the emperor system continued to play archaism as a virtual form of fascism that could actualize itself at any critical juncture.

For the analyses of this phase, Harootunian summons two discourses, both of which exemplify the postwar return of archaic thinking. One is the political scientist Maruyama Masao’s concept of “archaic stratum.” This means a subterranean rhythm that directed Japanese society since ancient times, by varying its intensity between moments of openness (or change) and those of closure (or withdrawal). With the recognition of the two opposing impetuses, Maruyama seemed to wish for a new beginning of modernization that would transform a folk socialized into feudal and hierarchical conformism into a modern, rational, and informed citizenry. Another discourse Harootunian draws upon is the literary critic Kobayashi Hideo’s “language spirit,” that he invoked from the 18th century nativist scholar Motoori Norinaga. In this notion, Kobayashi emphasized the nation’s possibility of change while keeping its essential identity like the mechanism in the Japanese language itself. While paying respect to these efforts to recontextualize the national body in the postwar society, Harootunian nevertheless considers that both “evoke the unchanging figure of remote antiquity in a society in which the noncontemporary still prevails over the contemporaneous.” Precisely in this way, “the archaic had become a political unconscious of modern Japan, a legacy of the Meiji Restoration that had been transported well into the postwar years.”

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Living in the dark time with crises on all fronts, we can hardly sustain our trust in the world that had once given us promises of progress and happiness. All problems from the past seem to be accumulating in the present, instead of being resolved on a higher ground, and expressing themselves in increasingly vicious manners. Their complex relations do not follow a historical development by the dialectic synthesis of contradictions in stages toward a unification of human and nature. In this situation, Harootunian’s philosophy of historical time could give us hints for developing a new practice of history, that is necessary for a reconsideration of the world for our struggles of survival, justice, and happiness. It suggests shifting our strategic attention from the narrative of power centers, that is, the view of world history as a synthesis of national histories, to those of omnipresent peripheries, whose ground is “the everyday” of us the people, that is, the battleground between the temporalities imposed on us and those we seek (the real agent of history). In this way, Harootunian’s philosophy provides us with implications to reconsider the idea of revolution. Even in this dark time, we continue to observe varied modes of oppositions, among which taking the power of a nation-state to replace it is but one – be it by violence or election. We are observing forms of popular struggle to decompose the regime, for their self-empowerment and autonomy, in reverberation across the world — as a spectrum of practices. What we could envision from the spectrum is a multiplicity of liberations instead of one for all at once. I believe that Harootunian’s philosophy of historical time reminds us of a richness in this tragic world.

Kim Myung-hwan, South Korean Writers in Solidarity with Palestine  

Korea and Palestine lie at the eastern and western ends of Asia, seemingly having little in common. But Korean poets and novelists (and their readers) have every reason to see Palestine’s catastrophe as their own. Despite their economic success and prosperity, South Koreans have been living under an uneasy armistice since the Korean War (1950-1953) much as the Palestinians have under Israeli’s prolonged military occupation albeit to very different degrees of precarity. Remote is the possibility of a planned all-out war in Korea, but an accidental military engagement between the North and South is likely to escalate to a dangerous armed conflict.  

In the late 1970s, South Korean writers and readers protesting against Park Chung Hee’s draconian military rule became interested in Palestinian literature as part of Third World resistance. The works of Mahmoud Darwish (1941-2008), Ghassan Kanafani (1936-1972), and others began to be translated and read by the Korean public. It was a new cultural phenomenon, because a binary view of Israel as “good” and the Arab world as “evil” had prevailed in South Korea due to its alliance with the United States. National division and the devastating history of the Korean War fostered such ultra-right, pro-American ethos in the South. At far-right rallies in Seoul today, participants still frequently wave American and Israeli flags alongside the South Korean flag.

Personally, the most moving piece of literature about the plight of Palestine is Ghassan Kanafani’s short story “Returning to Haifa” (1969). The author, assassinated by a car bomb implanted by the Mossad in 1972, tells the story of a Palestinian couple who, in the chaos of the 1948 War, were driven away from their home without their infant son. Twenty years later, they were finally able to visit their old home thanks to Israel’s temporary opening of the borders after its victory in the 1967 War. Upon their arrival, the couple discover that a Jewish couple had taken up their house along with their lost son, now a soldier of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). To the readers’ dismay, the young soldier shuns his biological parents, accusing them of having irresponsibly abandoned their child, and his Jewish adoptive mother seems insensitive to the agony of her adopted son’s parents despite being a Holocaust survivor. Up to this point, the Palestinian father had discouraged his second son from joining the armed resistance movement, but as he leaves his old home again, he tells his wife that he hopes their second son had already left to join the resistance. This tragedy of a Palestinian family portrayed by Kanafani is especially poignant for Korean readers because it so closely mirrors the experiences of Koreans who were suddenly displaced from their homes and separated from their families due to the national division and war, never to visit their homes or meet lost family members again.

It was only in 2003 when the United States invaded Iraq that South Korean writers began to collectively show interest in Palestine and take action for peace, partly because they had less experience in building international solidarity with overseas resistance movements. It took some years to actively promote international solidarity for peace and democracy after struggling against the overwhelmingly powerful military rule in South Korea that was finally toppled in 1987. In October 1994, radical young Korean writers organized the Korean Writers’ Solidarity for Vietnam (베트남을 이해하려는 젊은 작가들의 모임) to address war crimes committed by South Korean troops as the main ally of the U.S. military during the Vietnam War. These young writers established strong ties with Vietnamese writers including Bao Ninh, maintaining their connections for decades. Bao Ninh’s novel The Sorrow of War based on his direct seven-year military experience as a regular North Vietnamese soldier was banned for a long time in Vietnam mainly because the novel frankly depicted the sordid reality of war.

Building on such solidarity efforts, in 2003, dozens of activists formed the Korean Anti-War and Peace Team for Iraq (한국이라크반전평화팀) and traveled to Iraq, and the Korean Writers’ Association (한국작가회의, then known as the Writers’ Association for National Literature 민족문학작가회의) decided to send a writer along with the team. Soo Yeon Oh, a young female novelist seized the opportunity to get involved in this peace movement, not only in Iraq but also in Palestine, and worked with Ta’ayush (Living Together), a peace organization comprising both Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank. During her stay in Palestine, she happened to meet the Palestinian poet Zakaria Mohammad (1950-2023), and invited him to a literary event in South Korea. Since then, a number of Palestinian writers along with Mohammad have visited South Korea at the invitation of Korean writers to build solidarity. I might add that Zakaria Mohammad was once in danger of being killed by both the IDF and Muslim extremists at the same time, just as Bao Ninh was subjected to censorship by the Vietnamese government despite having bravely fought for the liberation of Vietnam.   

Last October, shortly after Israel’s genocidal response to the Hamas attacks, Palestinian writer Adania Shibli, whose novella Minor Detail had just been translated into Korean, came to Seoul at the invitation of the annual DMZ Literary Festival. DMZ, or the Demilitarized Zone, designates the 4 km area on either side of the cease-fire line between the North and South, an ironic name given that it is one of the most heavily armed regions in the world. A few days before Shibli’s arrival in Seoul, the LitProm association in Germany that hosts LiBeraturpreis (an annual prize given to female writers from Africa, Asia, Latin America or the Arab world during the Frankfurt International Book Fair) suddenly canceled (“postponed” in their official expression) its award ceremony for her. It was a disappointing decision that drove responsive Korean readers and writers to flock to hear her Seoul talk. As elsewhere in the world, Korean writers are sensitive to crackdowns on freedom of expression, but it is especially galling due to the history of censorship by authoritarian governments, not only under military dictatorships but as recently as 2008-2017, when the conservative government secretly blacklisted writers and artists critical of state policies. At the time of Shibli’s talk, the same repressive measures were being repeated under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration whose election in 2022 was by the narrowest margin (less than 1%) in all of South Korean electoral history. 

Anti-war protests among South Korean civil society have been smaller in scale compared to those in the West, but they have grass-roots potential because Korean writers and readers, on the basis of their own historical experience, deeply understand how urgent peace is and take the Palestinian calamity to be their own. On March 2, 2024, a poetry reading was hosted by a small bookstore in Paju, a city just fifteen miles away from the DMZ. A young Palestinian man, who managed to escape to Egypt and come to South Korea, gave a brief account of his own experience in Gaza to an audience of about twenty people, followed by a poetry reading for peace in Palestine. The event was joined not only by Koreans, but also by migrants from Uzbekistan, a Chinese student studying Korean literature, and others. The tiny bookstore is owned by a cooperative of sixteen members, and its next director is a Japanese woman married to a Korean whose daughters also attended the poetry reading. Events like these are being organized nationwide by writers, bookshop owners, and local activists. They hope that their endeavors will help create a truly diverse and egalitarian society, overcoming indifference and discrimination against refugees and migrant workers in Korea. The South Korean government provides refugee status to only about 2.8% of applicants, far below the average rate of OECD countries. Additionally, South Koreans have another important reason to be deeply wary of war. According to U.S. news reports, South Korea sent hundreds of thousands of artillery rounds to Ukraine via the U.S. military, exceeding the amount provided by all Western European countries combined. 

Israel seems ready to continue killing Palestinians unless they give up their resistance completely. But the history of humanity, filled with horrendous wars and massacres, proves that  ethnic cleansing leaves indelible scars in both the victims and victors. As D. H. Lawrence pointed out in his Studies in Classic American Literature, the United States of America was built on the ethnic cleansing of native Americans, a historical fact that explains the callous U.S. response toward events outside American soil including what is happening in Gaza. Links between worsening domestic social ills and imperialist foreign policies go unrecognized.

International solidarity is vital now. Korean writers and readers will continue to make persistent efforts, however small, to build such solidarity. Solidarity after all is not just about “helping others,” but about reforming ourselves by addressing the key challenges of difference, in the Korean case to overcome national division and achieve peace on the peninsula. In the Middle East where Judaism, Christianity, and Islam were all born, may solidarity build a world capable of embracing differences among these rich literary and spiritual traditions.

KIM Myung-hwan is Professor Emeritus in the Department of English Literature at Seoul National University

Gerald Roche, Rogue Journalists Are Denouncing The Gaza Genocide Because They Want You To Deny The Next One 

As thousands of bodies are blown apart in Gaza and children starve to death in the city’s rubble-strewn streets, numerous groups are exploiting this suffering in order to advance oppressive agendas such as anti-semitism and Islamophobia. One group, in particular, is doing this in a way that not only dishonours the victims of genocide, but also undermines international solidarity and impairs the Left’s ability to respond to future atrocities. 

I’m referring here to what Sri Lankan unionist and writer Rohini Hensman calls ‘pseudo-anti-imperialists’. Whilst presenting themselves as Leftists, they oppose some forms of imperialism while supporting others. Specifically, they oppose the imperialism of the USA and its allies, and in order to hasten the empire’s downfall, they support the imperialism of the USA’s primary adversaries: Russia, China, and Iran. Every opinion that pseudo-anti-imperialists hold, every reaction they have to international events, every movement they build and participate in is subordinated to a nuance-free friend-enemy distinction that splits along clear nation-state lines. 

In pursuing their realpolitik project of undermining US empire, pseudo-anti-imperialists do not interpret atrocities in terms of suffering or uprisings in terms of liberation. Such events are instead sorted into worthy or unworthy, authentic or fake, in terms of their perceived alignment with US interests. In Syria and Ukraine they side with Russia, and in Xinjiang and Hong Kong they side with China. Regardless of how many people get killed, imprisoned, tortured, or herded into concentration camps, the only thing that matters is opposing the US.

In consistently repeating the same message with every new wave of protest and each new mass atrocity, pseudo-anti-imperialists are like the proverbial stopped clock that tells the right time twice a day. Every so often, they incidentally extend support for the victims of state violence; not out of empathy, or principled solidarity, but simply because supporting those victims advances their agenda.

Watching the genocide in Gaza unfold on social media across the last five months has been like watching a thousand stopped clocks chiming in unison. As major media outlets around the world abandoned their ethics and obligations in order to equivocate about genocide and investigate the ethical complexities of bombing hospitals, these stopped clocks have suddenly become lodestars of public opinion and morality.

Why is this a problem?

If I was in Gaza now, if I was starving, or raising money to escape across the border, or searching for lost family members, or stumbling from one bombed-out refugee camp to another, I would not care who was bringing attention to my plight. So why does it matter who is promoting the Palestinian cause?

It’s a problem because the victims of the next mass atrocity will care when these stopped clocks chime denial and cast the dying as unworthy victims. The people who join the next wave of protests against authoritarianism will care when these stopped clocks decry their movement as a CIA op and rally people to oppose them and undermine their cause. 

Herein lies the problem of these pseudo-anti-imperialist stopped clocks: the solidarity that they build now by defending the Palestinian people will be extracted and later used as a weapon against other victims engaged in struggle with oppression elsewhere. 

I have seen the consequences of this firsthand, when I was living on the northern Tibetan Plateau in what is today China. When the largest Tibetan protests in modern history broke out in 2008, and later when over 150 people set fire to their own bodies in protest against the government, one of the most precious and desperately-sought resources in this struggle was international solidarity. But rather than supporting Tibetans, pseudo-anti-imperialists decried their struggle as a ‘color revolution’ sponsored by the CIA, leaving many Tibetans feeling a profound sense of betrayal, and also placing some at risk of real harm. From Bosnia to Syria, Hong Kong, Iran, and Xinjiang, this experience has been repeated across decades, with victims of state violence and people struggling for liberation being abandoned by pseudo-anti-imperialists and deprived of the solidarity they need to advance their causes and protect them from further violence.

Like these people, Palestinians need all the solidarity they can get right now. But so will the people engaged in the next struggle against state violence, and the next one, and in every struggle still to come. Therefore, we need to work now to build movements that will consistently support diverse struggles against oppression around the world. Doing so requires us to identify and confront pseudo-anti-imperialists, preventing them from turning our solidarity into a weapon against the weak and vulnerable in the next struggle. How can we do that?

The more amateurish pseudo-anti-imperialists can be easily spotted from the hammer and sickle icons in their social media handles, or by the presence of a mango emoji or the ‘anti-imperialist’ moniker in their bio. The larger, more influential pseudo-anti-imperialists tend to eschew such clear signaling, preferring to describe themselves as ‘rogue journalists,’ ‘truth tellers’ or some other label that makes them sound like a QAnon prophet that accidentally wandered away from Gab. More troubling still are the institutions that peddle pseudo-anti-imperialism under the name of feminism, progressivism, peace, or generic Leftism.

Because pseudo-anti-imperialists successfully veil their politics in Leftist garb in order to parasitize our internationalism and weaponize our solidarity, we also need to turn to their rhetoric and track record to successfully identify them.

One tell in their texts is a preference for clarity over insight. Because they roam from one conflict to another, pseudo-anti-imperialists almost always lack the skills (such as knowledge of relevant languages) or contextual background to help us understand what is happening and why. So instead of providing information, they restate things we already know, but with additional moral force, sometimes aided by extra punctuation. Genocide is wrong. They. Tortured. UN. Staff. When you read viral posts about Gaza, ask yourself whether they provide new information or merely affirm existing sentiment; if the latter, then you may be reading the work of a pseudo-anti-imperialist. 

We can also look to a commentator’s track record of commentary to identify pseudo-anti-imperialists. Xinjiang and Hong Kong provide two useful litmus tests, as does Ukraine. Pseudo-anti-imperialists have consistently taken the side of the aggressor and oppressor in each of these situations, and their feeds are full of snarling cynicism that casts human suffering as simply artificial media opportunities that generate consent for US aggression. 

If their loud denialism in these contexts gives away pseudo-anti-imperialists, so too does their consistent silence about events which they cannot parse in terms of US interests, or which simply do not generate enough public attention for them to parasitize. When ISIS carried out a genocide against the Yazidi people, killing around 5,000 people and displacing many thousands more, pseudo-anti-imperialists said nothing. During the Rohingya genocide that displaced three quarters of a million people and killed tens of thousands from 2016 onwards, pseudo-anti-imperialists said nothing. When the Indonesian state engaged in disproportionate retaliation against Papuan militants in 2018, killing dozens and driving thousands into camps, pseudo-anti-imperialists said nothing. And from 2020 to 2022, when thousands of people were being bombed, shot, starved, or displaced and rounded up into camps in Tigray, pseudo-anti-imperialists said nothing. 

This sort of track record of repeated denial and silence not only helps us identify pseudo-anti-imperialists, it also shows us that they simply cannot be trusted to consistently stand up for and defend victims of state violence. Their project is not based on a principled commitment to liberation. They are not comrades or allies, they are reactionaries who defend authoritarian states and aim to generate impunity for their violence. Pseudo-anti-imperialists should not be included in any internationalist Left efforts to resist imperialism and domination.

As the genocide in Gaza grinds on, instead of helping these bad-faith commentators build their fanbase by exploiting human suffering, we should work to undermine their power, and raise up the voices of Palestinians and anti-genocide Israelis. We can rely on such people for real insights into what is happening in Gaza. And just as importantly, we can also rely on them for real solidarity in the future, when inevitably, the next genocide begins unfurling, or when people once again rise up against oppression to demand their freedom. Because chances are, when this happens again, the pseudo-anti-imperialist stopped clocks will be chiming to drown out the cries of the afflicted.    

Gerald Roche is Associate Professor of Politics at La Trobe University

 

Toshikuni Doi, Gaza Residents Are “Double Victims” of Both Israeli Forces and Hamas

February 27,  2024

I spent 30 days on the ground during the Gaza offensive in the summer of 2014. About 2,100 Gaza residents were killed and hundreds of thousands were displaced. But the scale of the Israeli attack on Gaza this time has been completely different from the previous four attacks on Gaza, both in scale and length: at the end of February 2024, the death toll is far more than 10 times that of the 2014 attack on Gaza, and more than a million people have lost their homes.

What has further afflicted the Palestinians is that the Israeli blockade has cut off food, water, fuel, medicine, and other necessities of life, pushing the population to the brink of starvation. M, a journalist in Gaza with whom I have been in regular contact, said, “A family of five eats one meal a day, and they don’t even have flour, their staple food. They drink water by boiling irrigation water. Vegetables are scarce, expensive, and hard to come by. They are making do with expired canned goods and beans that they can barely get their hands on.”

In the winter during the rainy season, there is neither sufficient warm clothing nor heating when it is very cold. Living in tents is especially hard on children. Influenza and other infectious diseases are spreading among the children. In addition, children are forced to drink unclean water and suffer from abdominal infections.

Mental trauma

Even more serious is the psychological damage to the children caused by the prolonged Israeli military assault and the harsh living conditions.

M, who has three children under the age of five, reported to me, “The children cry and scream in the middle of the night. They wake up in the middle of the night screaming and yelling as if they are having nightmares. They need psychological treatment.”

It’s not just children. M says that adults are also exposed to the sound of shelling every night and are constantly tormented by the fear that their homes might be shelled. Many Palestinian residents are preoccupied with ‘survival.’ This is why the residents M meets on the streets and in stores, especially the younger generation, all say, “I will leave Gaza when the fighting is over. The social infrastructure and economy of Gaza have been almost completely destroyed.” M predicts that it will take at least two to three decades to rebuild it, unlike in the past. “I don’t see a future for Gaza. Gaza is finished!” M said to me.

Rage against Hamas

Needless to say, the people of Gaza harbor immense hatred and anger toward Israel, which has murdered more than 30,000 of them, destroyed their infrastructure, starved them with its blockade, and shattered their dreams for the future.

But Israel is not the only target of residents’ anger, according to M. “Anger against Hamas, which triggered the Israeli attack on Gaza, is increasing daily among Gazans as the Israeli army’s unprecedented assault and genocide continues, and there is a growing chorus of voices on the streets and social networking sites vehemently condemning the Hamas leadership.”

At the beginning of the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, “there were certainly some residents who supported the Hamas attack, saying that it ‘punished’ Israel for what it had done to the Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem,” M said. However, many residents reportedly did not have enough information about what atrocities Hamas had actually committed inside Israel.

On February 8, M told us in a video message.

“People are calling [Yahya] Shinwar [Hamas’ chief executive in the Gaza Strip] a ‘son of the devil,’ a ‘crazy adventurist,’ and other such epithets. Shinwar has brought about this utterly senseless catastrophe. People have no idea what the purpose of the October 7 attack was, and they ask: What did you [Hamas] accomplish with this attack? The liberation of Palestine through armed struggle? That is impossible. What is the purpose of that madness!”

Another factor contributing to the anger of Gaza residents against Hamas is Hamas’ refusal to release the hostages and agree to a ceasefire, even though the people have suffered tremendous damage and are exhausted from the attacks. Meanwhile, the Gaza residents are being killed one by one and suffering from starvation.

Israeli reaction

Meanwhile, in Israel, there have been daily demonstrations shouting, “The Netanyahu government must make the release of the hostages its top priority!” However, in the face of the horrific situation in Gaza, where 30,000 Gaza residents have been killed by Israeli troops and more than 2 million people are suffering from starvation, almost no one is saying, “Stop the attack!” Most Israelis think that “the terrorist group Hamas, which has massacred some 1,300 Israelis, must be destroyed. The Gaza residents who support Hamas are equally guilty, and they should be held responsible.”

But many Gaza residents, angered by Hamas and its actions, have been destroyed, starved, and ruthlessly murdered in Israeli military attacks. The 2.2 million Gazans are “double victims” of both the Israeli military and Hamas.

Toshikuni Doi is an independent journalist and filmmaker
http://www.doi-toshikuni.net/e/index.html