Giorgio Agamben, “The state of exception provoked by an unmotivated emergency”

This is a translation of an article that first appeared as “Lo stato d’eccezione provocato da un’emergenza immotivata,” in il manifesto, 26 Feb, 2020.

In order to make sense of the frantic, irrational, and absolutely unwarranted emergency measures adopted for a supposed epidemic of coronavirus, we must begin from the declaration of the Italian National Research Council (NRC), according to which “there is no SARS-CoV2 epidemic in Italy.”

It continues: in any case “the infection, according to the epidemiological data available as of today and based on tens of thousands of cases, causes light/moderate symptoms (a variant of flu) in 80-90% of cases. In 10-15%, there is a chance of pneumonia, but which also has a benign outcome in the large majority of cases. We estimate that only 4% of patients require intensive therapy.”

If this is the real situation, why do the media and the authorities do their utmost to create a climate of panic, thus provoking a true state of exception, with severe limitations on movement and the suspension of daily life and work activities for entire regions?

Two factors can help explain such a disproportionate response.

First and foremost, what is once again manifest here is the growing tendency to use the state of exception as a normal governing paradigm. The executive decree (decreto legge), approved by the government “for reasons of hygiene and public safety,” produces a real militarization “of those municipalities and areas in which there is at least one person who tests positive and for whom the source of the infection is unknown, or in which there is a least one case that is not connected to a person who recently traveled from an area affected by the contagion.”

Such a vague and indeterminate formula will allow [the government] to rapidly extend the state of exception to all regions, as it is practically impossible that other cases will not appear elsewhere.

Let us consider the serious limitations of freedom imposed by the executive decree:

  1. A prohibition against leaving the affected municipality or area for all people in that municipality or area.
  2. A prohibition against entering the affected municipality or area
  3. The suspension of all events or initiatives (regardless of whether they are related to culture, sport, religion, or entertainment), and a suspension of meetings in any private or public space, including enclosed spaces if they are open to the public.
  4. The suspension of educational services in kindergartens and schools at every level, including higher education and excluding only distance learning.
  5. The closure of museums and other cultural institutions as listed in article 101 of the Statute on cultural heritage and landscape, and in executive decree number 42 from 01/22/2004. All regulations on free access to those institutions are also suspended.
  6. The suspension of all kinds of educational travel, in Italy and abroad.
  7. The suspension of all publicly held exams and all activities of public offices, except essential services or public utility services.
  8. The enforcement of quarantine and active surveillance on individuals who had close contact with confirmed cases of infection.

    It is blatantly evident that these restrictions are disproportionate to the threat from what is, according to the NRC, a normal flu, not much different from those that affect us every year.

    We might say that once terrorism was exhausted as a justification for exceptional measures, the invention of an epidemic could offer the ideal pretext for broadening such measures beyond any limitation.

The other factor, no less disquieting, is the state of fear, which in recent years has diffused into individual consciousnesses and which translates into a real need for states of collective panic, for which the epidemic once again offers the ideal pretext.

Therefore, in a perverse vicious circle, the limitation of freedom imposed by governments is accepted in the name of a desire for safety, which has been created by the same governments who now intervene to satisfy it.

Federico Marcon, Historical Knowledge, Historians’ Categories, and the Question of “Fascism”

In this piece, a preview of his in-progress book manuscript, Federico Marcon questions whether our generalized use of the term “fascism”—covering both the historical phenomena of the 1920s-30s and the contemporary resurgence of right-wing populism all over the globe—is justified or helpful as a category for analysis. For Marcon, this is not a question of semantics, and possibly not even of historical accuracy, but a crucial issue of theoretical precision and political strategy. “Fascism,” he tells us, is a term that is simultaneously meaningless and overloaded with meaning(s). As such, it cannot illuminate the political character of historical or contemporary movements. And furthermore, it obscures the fact that revolutionary conservatism is not an outside threat to liberal democracy; rather it originates within and is produced by liberal democratic institutions.

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Aminda Smith, Of Martyrs and Maladies: Some Thoughts on the Coronavirus

When I learned that the 34-year-old ophthalmologist and whistleblower Li Wenliang had died, I felt a surge of grief and then a deep sense of dread. These emotions surprised me. I did not know Dr. Li, though I had followed his story with great interest, as he faced official censure for warning his colleagues, and then the public, about a virulent strain of pneumonia, which seemed poised to have a significant mortality rate. Even after CCP authorities admitted that a novel Coronavirus was indeed sickening and killing people, there were still attempts to silence Li, as he and seven others were arrested and ordered to stop “spreading rumors.”  Li became a hero to a terrified, quarantined populace; someone who dared to stand up to the state and tell the truth. When the virus he’d tried to stop killed him, it was more than tragic because it was chillingly consistent with the logics of both the state and its resisters. The battle against the state-abetted Coronavirus had a martyr.  

Since the emergence of the Coronavirus, many have made comparisons to the SARS outbreak that began in 2002. But tales of heroic doctors, narratives of truth-concealing politicians, and racialized tropes of “Chinese diseases” also made me think of the San Francisco Plague outbreak in 1900. There too a recently identified pathogen with a terrifying history served as a vector for racist fears of the “other,” critiques of official corruption, and the valorization of resistance.

At the turn of the 20th century, China (or at least Chinese people) were, as now, increasingly imagined as a threat — to American jobs, to an American way of life, and after the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, even to American lives. Something reminiscent of the 21st century trade war also raged — the 1882 Exclusion Act, which barred Chinese laborers from entering the U.S, was met with boycotts of U.S. goods in Guangzhou, Shanghai and beyond. In that context, an outbreak of the Bubonic Plague spread across Southern China. By 1894, it had killed more than 100,000 people in Guangzhou alone. Five years later, when a Chinese-American man died of the plague in San Francisco’s Chinatown, few questioned the claim that the disease had come via ships from the West. 

The Chinatown outbreak, which killed 119 (out of 121 cases) between 1900 and 1904, also had a heroic doctor, who spoke truth to power. Dr. Joseph Kinyoun, a rising star who had worked with Louis Pasteur and received his M.D. at New York’s Bellevue Hospital, diagnosed and confirmed the presence of plague in San Francisco.  Like Dr. Li Wenliang, Dr. Kinyoun wanted to sound the alarm, but city officials suppressed the news and lifted the brief quarantine they had instituted—a quarantine that had only applied to Asian residents. California governor Henry Gage argued publically that the plague was a hoax and that Kinyoun had injected plague bacillus into Chinese corpses. While officials denied the existence of the outbreak, they stopped Chinese people from entering California and strong armed Chinatown residents, searching their homes and businesses and confiscating and/or burning anything “dirty.” When the Chinese Six Companies sued the city over its treatment of its Chinese residents, they too suggested that Dr. Kinyoun was a quack looking to stir up trouble. Even after Californian authorities admitted there was indeed an outbreak of the Bubonic plague in San Francisco, they continued to cast Kinyoun as a troublemaker and eventually exiled him from the state.

It feels like justice, like vindication, to venerate the truth-tellers. It feels like a triumph of right over wrong to commemorate the heroism of Drs. Li and Kinyoun, whom the powerful sought to silence and scapegoat in the service of dark aims. Yet scapegoats and martyrs are but opposite manifestations of the same impulse—an urge to locate a terror, a despair, a sense of dread, which all arise from our awareness that we are often powerless against that interlocking web of social, political, and biological pathogens (forces that appear natural but may be human-made and that are difficult to fathom, let alone theorize). If we can simplify these seemingly insurmountable exploitations of biopower, render them stories about the power of truth over lies, we have someone to blame and someone to grieve. 

But as much as I share the feeling of horror at the all-too-logical death of Li Wenliang, I am troubled by the way its narrativization fits all too nicely with neoliberal logics of truth, choice, and the autonomy of the individual.  On February 7, the New York Times ran an opinion piece titled “Chairman Mao and the Coronavirus: China turns away from seeking truth from facts.” The author, David Leonhardt, referenced the 1978 “truth criterion” debate, which is often seen as a watershed marking the triumph of Deng Xiaoping era “empiricism” and openness to truth over the ideological lies and obedience that supposedly characterized the Mao Years.  “It’s no coincidence,” continued Leonhardt, “that China since 1978 has enjoyed one of the most phenomenal economic booms on record.” The Times columnist apparently “thought of this history when reading the heart-rending story of Li Wenliang,” and this led him to muse that “Under China’s current leader, Xi Jinping, the government has moved away from Deng’s empirical approach and back toward Mao’s rigid ideology. The coronavirus crisis is an example of the damage that approach can do.” While Leonhardt expresses sympathy for the individual, Li Wenliang, his concluding remark suggests that his primary concern is not for the Chinese: “And unlike a half-century ago, China is a powerful, globally integrated country, which means that its tragedies can more easily become global tragedies.”

Leonhardt’s celebration of an earlier, more “pragmatic,” yet no less neoliberal China — especially when juxtaposed with his fear of the globalized, powerful China of today — highlights that crucial contradiction, which the Coronavirus crisis has further rendered visible. That is, the tension between a neoliberal insistence on individual autonomy and the free circulation of capital, on the one hand, and collective good and global welfare, on the other. Reports from inside and outside of China hold the CCP and the PRC state responsible for a dangerous, even diabolical silencing of truth, which may have contributed to the death of  a man who tried to stop them. More quietly, and with much performative handwringing over the government’s surveillance capacities, those same media celebrate that same Party-state for its ability to very pragmatically impose quarantines over millions of people. A global media discourse that forefronts oppositions between honest and corrupt, scapegoat and martyr, truth and lies, seems almost purposely crafted to obscure another truth — that the globalizing imperatives and climate devastation of neoliberal capitalism spur a race for limited resources that pits “us” against “the other.” The alienation, the dread, and the horror of that spectacle can easily be shifted from commercial markets to environments of viral contagion. The dehumanization and disempowerment that these processes produce help to explain my, and our, overpowering visceral and affective responses to the briefly empowered, if ultimately doomed, and thus very human, figure of the martyr.

Simone Pieranni: Hong Kong, the first revolt against surveillance capitalism

Simone Pieranni, China desk editor for the newspaper Il Manifesto, wrote this piece for the Italian online journal Sinosfere, following up on my own contribution in that venue. We translated it and republished here, as it fits well with Rebecca Karl’s post and explores the crucial dimension of “surveillance capitalism.” Thanks to Simone and Sinosfere.

Fabio Lanza’s piece on Sinosfere about what has been happening in Hong Kong since last June has the merit of broadening our perspective. Beyond the limitations that people “from the left” have singled out—folding back on localism, appeals for help to London and Washington, all contradictions that, in different forms, can be found even within instances of mobilization that have faced and kept in check the repressive apparatuses of other nation-states, like the gilet jaunes or Catalunya—Lanza signals how the Hong Kong protests reflect “in a polysemic and complex manner, a crisis within capitalism, specifically the explosion of the tension between, on the one hand, assertions of political subjectivity and desire to participate and, on the other, a system that systematically represses these aspirations in the name of market freedom.”

Let’s now try to increase the chronological distance and project ourselves into the future (which is already the present). We must do that, because in Hong Kong, the protest has taken on a peculiar character, especially in the street—that is, in direct action—and has seen mostly students or the very young as its protagonists. It has also pointed at a series of political intersections that involve us directly.

Hong Kong can indeed be grouped together with all the other rebellions against neoliberalism that we have observed throughout 2019, but this protest has “pushed” more strongly than any other on certain specific issues. What has been happening in Hong Kong has looked at times more like luddism, at times hacker activism, and at times mediatic self-organization. Physically attacking street cameras, removing and destroying them (since July 2019 at least 900 security cams are supposed to have been “switched off,” and that does not include those damaged or obscured in subway stations); deploying the technological systems more usefully to organize (Telegram has denounced interference from Chinese hackers precisely because it is one of the tools most used by protestors); hiding or using one’s body against those who can use bodies to repress; managing the entire communications with apps; inventing memes. This armory of tools highlights a crucial point: what’s taking place in Hong Kong is the first true revolt against surveillance capitalism, that is capitalism in its (so far) most advanced phase, capable of expropriating (extracting) data at no cost in order to perpetuate its system of domination and throw back into poverty large strata of the knowledgeable masses to whom much different promises had been made. And if anyone has a problem with attaching the term “capitalism” to China, we could easily call it “socialism with Chinese characteristics;” it makes no difference [if the we observe these same mechanisms in both].

The protagonists of this form of struggle are in the large majority young.As Sandro Mezzadra has pointed out, what’s happening in Hong Kong “must be placed within a new conjuncture, in which the investment and the penetration of productive urban texture through new technologies confer a special significance to what in other contexts is called ‘the knowledge economy’ and to strata of cognitive labor, which is essentially youth labor.” In the former British colony, we have witnessed a rebellion against what Shosana Zuboff (author of The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power) synthesizes as such: “a parasitic economic logic in which the production of goods and services is subordinated to a new global architecture of behavioral modification” (https://www.moralmarkets.org/book/the-age-of-surveillance-capitalism/).

These “riots 4.0” could not but involve China, which is the current exemplar—even if with its unique “characteristics”—of this global tendency (of which it is also one of many exporters). It is not by chance that just before Christmas, a protest took place in Hong Kong in support of Uyghurs, the Turkish and Muslim minority in Xinjiang (“we are next,” chanted the Hong Kong protestors). Xinjiang is the periphery in which one can experiment unnoticed (except for some minor incidents, immediately covered up by Beijing’s economic might https://ilmanifesto.it/cina-cosa-ce-nei-xinjiang-papers-del-new-york-times/ ) and Hong Kong is the neoliberal financial hub. These are the two territories where the mechanisms of state surveillance (with Chinese characteristics) are being deployed.

But in the financial hub, everything is eventually exposed. “Be water” they repeat in Hong Kong: a new epic narrative was needed, a non-face in the age of facial recognition, a wave-like, water-like way of moving which cannot be traced in the age of territorial tracking, cash in the age of trackable mobile payments, something ever changing in the age of wealth extraction from our bodies in order to exploit that “moment” analyzed by Mezzadra. After all, China today is a giant under transformation, a huge apparatus of social engineering which has found in technological evolution a way to remain hyper-productive on global markets and control its people, while extracting from them the knowhow needed to excel in the age of surveillance capitalism. And where the grasp is less tight, as in Hong Kong, what can happen is that young people, students—who are living the transition between impoverishment (housing, salaries, etc.) and being the object of extraction—are the first to “feel” the problem. China might come up with a creative solution (Chinese politicians are more prone to political inventions than their Western counterparts, for example the theory of “one country, two systems” would have been inconceivable in the West). Or this first rebellion against surveillance capitalism might exhaust itself as happened with similar movements, even if in different contexts. However, Hong Kong in the end does give us something, by revealing to us the form, the sinuous perseverance that one will have to have in order to struggle against and modify the future which is already the present.