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Oleksii Polegkyi, (Im)possible Peace in Ukraine

On the 11th of February 1945, the Yalta Agreement was signed by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. This Agreement divided Europe for the decades to come. On 12th February 2015, the Minsk Accord II was signed by Russia, Ukraine, and OSCE [the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] as an attempt to stop a war that was then escalating in the Eastern part of Ukraine. Many in the Kremlin enjoy symbolic allusions. But Karl Marx said that history repeats itself, first as tragedy, then as farce.

The current Russian military build-up around Ukraine has raised fears of a possible Russian offensive that could extend beyond the territories in eastern Ukraine currently controlled by the Kremlin and lead to full-scale war between the two countries. Vladimir Putin has never accepted the independence of Ukraine. He has now hinted broadly that his patience with Kyiv is running out. In summer 2021, Putin again openly questioned the legitimacy of Ukraine as an independent state and laid bare his own imperial ambitions for Russia. Moscow’s problem is that Ukraine is, despite all problems, escaping Russia’s hold. 

Situation in the Donbas under Zelensky’s presidency

Despite some achievements in 2019–20 (mainly in humanitarian aspects), a solution to the war in the Donbas (Eastern Ukraine) is nowhere close. Russia’s attitude toward Ukraine or regarding conflict resolution is unchanging. Its main goal is to push the Ukrainian government into direct negotiations with representatives of the occupational administrations of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics (DNR/LNR) and block Ukraine’s movement towards NATO and Europe. DNR/LNR are quasi-states fully controlled by the Kremlin which have remained the primary scene of the Donbas War since 2014. In response to Putin’s pressure, President Zelensky’s position on the Ukraine has remained unequivocal: legitimate elections in the occupied parts of the Donbas should take place only in a secure environment—namely, after the withdrawal of Russian troops and return of the eastern border to Ukrainian control.

Furthermore, contrary to the Kremlin’s demands, the topic of Crimea is still on the agenda. For example, the Crimea Platform was established by President Zelensky in February 2021 in order to build a coordinated international effort to pressure Russia to leave the Crimean Peninsula. The inaugural Summit of the Crimea Platform was held in Kyiv on 23 August 2021, with representatives of forty-six countries. Ukraine hopes to consolidate international efforts in this area, and the initiative will focus on tasks such as enforcing sanctions and countering Russia’s militarization of the Crimea, as well as monitoring human rights and environmental threats.

Domestic policy obviously plays an important role in both countries. Putin’s imperial drive is rooted in the domestic dynamics of the Russian power regime. It is largely due to the nature and structure of Russian politics, which needs to generate a permanent sense of threat for domestic purposes because the state inherently needs militarization to preserve Putin`s system of power. The country is constantly either preparing for war against an external enemy or pursuing enemies at home.

President Zelensky’s options are limited: even if he could accept Moscow’s deal, Ukrainian society would not accept “peace under any conditions.” However, Ukraine has not managed to present a realistic vision for the resolution of the conflict or a strategy for re-integrating the occupied parts of Eastern Ukraine without the Kremlin’s willingness to cooperate.

Russia has continued its practice of granting citizenship to Ukrainian residents of the occupied Donbas territories, having already distributed more than 650,000 Russian passports. In essence, the negotiations under the Minsk format have reached a dead end, with Russia not having managed to achieve its aim to implement the accord on its own conditions. The Normandy format (a negotiating group involving  Germany, Russia, Ukraine and France, whose representatives met in an effort to resolve the war in Donbas) also seems to be unviable as a platform for negotiations.

The main obstacles to ending the war in the Donbas are not only different approaches toward the negotiations but the fundamentally different aims of Russia and Ukraine. For Ukraine, the end of its conflict with Russia would require the restoration of its sovereignty, while Russia expects to always keep Ukraine in its “sphere of privileged interests” and influence Ukrainian internal affairs. As summarized by the British analyst Duncan Allan concerning the dilemma of the Minsk Accord: “Ukraine views the Minsk Process as a chance to restore its sovereignty, whereas Russia sees it as an opportunity to curtail this sovereignty.”[1]

Russia’s goals in the potential escalation

For Russia, creating hybrid threats is its main strategy. An important aspect of Russian information and psychological operations is the so-called reflexive control (RC), which is closely related to the Chinese concept of “stratagems” and the concept of “perception management”. Reflexive control (RC) is the term used to describe the practice of predetermining an adversary’s decision in your favor, by altering key factors in the adversary’s perception of the world or of a certain situation.

Russia has essentially reached its limits concerning its possibilities to exert pressure on Ukraine, but it cannot accept real peace in a Donbas under Ukrainian control, as that would be perceived as weakness of the Kremlin and personally of Vladimir Putin.

In this sense, Russia’s military manoeuvres have primarily political objectives. First, Russia is seeking to “reset” its negotiations with the USA and increase the international influence of Moscow (not only with regard to Ukraine) through its traditional strategy of military-political blackmail.  The Kremlin often uses the tactic of raising tensions and then, in exchange for calming down, it gets something smaller that before was unacceptable but now suffices to diffuse the situation.

 Second, through its demonstration of military might the Kremlin is trying to force Kyiv to be more accommodating and compliant.

And third, Russia is desperate to prevent Ukraine’s rapprochement and deeper cooperation with NATO.

Additionally, the Kremlin is trying to divide the “West” as much as possible (most importantly, by, creating more tensions and contradictions between the US and European countries).

Moscow can again use its favourite tactics to increase tensions and blackmail Ukraine, with the end game of gaining a better negotiating position. A British House of Commons Report concluded: “Russia has several probable motives for escalating tensions on the border with Ukraine, driven by regional insecurities and President Putin’s willingness to engage in power politics. Russia is using its military for coercive diplomacy, to pressure the Ukrainian Government to make concessions in the political settlements for the Donbas and to test Western allies’ resolve to come to Ukraine’s aid.”[2]

One of the main pillars of Ukraine’s efforts to neutralize the Russian threat is to obtain international support and increase sanctions on the Russian Federation. Unfortunately for Ukraine, in the eyes of US and even the European Union – Ukraine is a good cause but not vital to its strategic interests. For Putin, it is a key for keeping power and for Russian national interest.

At least, during last few months, Vladimir Putin already got more international attention than he had received in many years. On the one hand, then, Russian maneuvers around Ukraine could be very costly for Moscow, because they recreate fear of Russia in Europe and mobilize opponents of Kremlin policy. But the Kremlin will try to get what it can in this situation. For example, Russia will try to force Germany and France to press Kyiv to implement Minsk Agreement II on Moscow’s conditions. But for Ukraine, this is unacceptable because it will lead to endless internal conflicts and will destroy the country.

Conclusion

In the overall perception of the Kremlin, Russia continues to be at war with the West (writ large) and it is a war in multiple domains simultaneously. This war is not a frozen conflict but a multi-theatre confrontation that is highly dynamic and can be activated by Moscow in any domain that it wants, e.g., conventional escalation in Ukraine, Belarus, or any other place.[3]

The attempts of some European countries to cooperate with Moscow in consensus mode or to “reset” relations are perceived by the Kremlin as weakness and will only provoke more aggressive actions on its part.

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has a longstanding strategic and even ontological character. Russia has no interest in a real peace for Ukraine and wants to keep the country as destabilized as possible. Putin’s speeches on many occasions highlight the constancy of his perception of the Ukrainian state as impermanent and of its existence as not justified by any reason. Because the Russian elite cannot accept the existence of an independent Ukraine (with constant emphasis on Ukraine’s full dependency, “failed state” status, disintegration, etc.), it will inevitably lead either to Ukraine being incorporated (in one form or another) into the sphere of “exclusive” Russian influence and under the full control of Moscow. Or, it will lead to Putin’s model of authoritarian regime, one that is based on ideas of revanchism, to be destroyed and Russia will transform itself into a democratic state. In other words, the existence of an independent Ukraine is possible only if the Russian Federation undergoes a profound transformation. As at the moment there is no chance of such a change (at least in the short term), the war between the two countries will continue. However, its intensity may increase or decrease, depending on the internal situation in the Russian Federation, the situation in the world, and the abilities of Ukraine to counteract Russian aggression.  

The Kremlin, having made Ukraine part of Russia’s domestic political agenda, cannot accept the loss of Ukraine. By the same token, the Kremlin cannot allow Ukraine to develop successfully (especially after 2014) because this would mean a failure of Russian efforts, which could become an example for its own opposition-minded citizens and inspire them to protest in Russia and in the whole post-Soviet space. That is why Ukraine as a failed state or a basket case is a condition, a sine qua non for the survival of the current Kremlin elites.

At the same time, for an absolute majority of Ukrainians it is already impossible to imagine Ukraine under the control of Moscow. For millions of Ukrainians war will not have started at some point in the near future. Rather, war started already in 2014. Eight years of war have changed dramatically the perception of Russia (even for those who had had positive attitudes towards Russia) and Ukrainian society demonstrates a readiness to fight for their own country. According to a survey conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS)[4] in December 2021, 33.3% of the population is ready to put up armed resistance; and 21.7% are ready to resist by participating in civil resistance actions. A Russian invasion will be catastrophic for Ukraine, but also for Russia. Russia can destroy the Ukrainian military, but it will not be able to control the territory and population of Ukraine.

The scenario of developing a constant threat of conflict escalation and pushing Ukraine into endless internal confrontations will remain the basic formula for the Russian model of “controlled chaos” in the neighboring country for the foreseeable future.

Dr. Oleksii Polegkyi is the Academic Director, Center for Public Diplomacy, Ukraine 

 

 

NOTES

[1] Duncan Allan. “The Minsk Conundrum: Western Policy and Russia’s War in Eastern Ukraine,” Chatham House,  22 May 2020; https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/minsk-conundrum-allan

[2] “Russia and Ukraine border tensions,” Report, House of Commons, 29 June 2021, p.12; https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/6567/documents/71219/default/

[3]Polegkyi, Oleksii & Stepniowski, Tomasz (eds.) „Security dilemma in the Black Sea region in the light of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict”, IES Policy Papers, Institute of Central Europe, Poland, N5, 2021; https://ies.lublin.pl/ies-policy-papers/security-dilemma-in-the-black-sea-region-in-light-of-the-russian-ukrainian-conflict/?fbclid=IwAR1-PgJHMwTEa5ZlB0183v-Zm1dez2Rwzx3lMDLLYZdV6n9XjlvF0SgwRyA

[4]“Will Ukrainians resist Russian intervention”, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), December 3-11, 2021; https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1079&page=1

I-Yi Hsieh, Global Friction on Wet Markets

Almost two years into the global pandemic of Covid-19, the contention surrounding wet markets as one of the pandemic’s outbreak origin narratives remains. Amid the furor of demanding that China put a blanket ban on wet markets, a rare agreement emerged among Mitch McConnell, Jane Goodall, Paul McCartney, and Anthony Fauci in March-May 2020. Declaring wet market as the literal and symbolic place of the “dirty, cruel, and primitive Asians” who butcher animals in public, hands and aprons covered in blood, a global discourse stigmatizing wet markets has peaked in the pandemic anxiety. Anthropologists have since attempted to combat these false charges by clarifying the point that the wild animal trade is a rare presence in the daily food markets of China, known as wet markets in English (Lynteris and Fearnley 2020). Some have gone further to argue that wet markets are a local way of food consumption that value neighborhood, face-to-face interactions while acquiring the benefit of reducing the over-packaging of food items commonly seen in supermarkets (Cheung 2020). What is missing in the two sides of global discourses pertinent to the issue at hand is the labor history of wet markets. This community-scaled food infrastructure is widely available not only in the People’s Republic of China, but also in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Southeast Asia, among other places. This is not to mention that the term “wet market” was first minted in official policy in Singapore in the 1970s, as the city-state began to differentiate air-conditioned supermarkets from food vendors using ice to keep produce fresh at the stall, in open-air temperatures. When the ice melted and sometimes dampened the market’s floor, there emerged the attribution of “wetness” in the term “wet market.” It is thus fair to argue that wet markets, as a category and a named social practice aimed at global translatability, is in and of itself a post-war invention. 

The international advocates for a ban on wet markets amid the pandemic turns out to be evidence of a continuous Orientalism reinforced by the anti-China sentiment fueled by the pandemic. Looking back, it is now clear that wet markets were the scapegoat for the dismantled public health care system and other social problems looming underneath the just-on-time capitalism of our age. Even the contentious Huanan Seafood Market itself, now forced to close, was a wholesale food market mostly supplying restaurants and was a congregation of cross-province trucks and large refrigerators, with Wuhan being China’s inland hub city. This fact runs counter to the Euro-American ascription of the Huanan Seafood Market being a small, dirty “wet market” filled with random transactions. Instead, it was a well-organized wholesale organization managed by the Huanan Fruits Wholesale company with an investment amounting to about US$7.68 million. The scale of the marketplace itself is a story of contemporary China: it encompassed 50,000 square meters (12.36 acres) and in this sense, it resembled the textile, small merchandise, art, or even antique-collecting markets emblematic of the unique form of megasized wholesale commercial zones birthed in China’s market reform era. In 2011, the total trade at the Huanan Seafood Market amounted to US$183 million, [1] with the parent company of its management being a real estate corporation. It has even received the title of “Civilized Market in Wuhan” several times.[2] The main investors in the wholesale space include 24 corporations from Wuhan, Shanghai, and Beijing.

What about Taiwan?

Since mid-2020, I have started to conduct ethnographic fieldwork at several wet markets in Taipei—first initiated as a rebuttal to the global stigmatization of wet markets as a global biosecurity risk embedded in the capitalist food system. Indeed, local food markets in Asia are now deeply woven into the international food system and cargo logistics, while they also employ a large labor force to process animal meats and produce on behalf of Asia’s rising urban consumers alienated from the complex, and highly uneven food production process. Yet fieldwork has its own ontogenesis to surprise a researcher. I gradually found that the issues surrounding biosecurity always point to biopolitics. It is not only true that the flow of air in outdoor markets helps to reduce the aerosol transmission of the Covid-19 virus, which makes the outdoor wet markets in Taiwan a safer space to shop than supermarkets and the government-managed indoor compounds, both of which are sometimes located in basements with cramped stalls in an environment of bad ventilation. It is also true that the labor history and friction over wet market vendors is very telling of Taiwan society’s tangled relationship with capitalism through the colonial to post-war times. 

As anyone who has ever been to Taiwan would know, the gigantic, indoor compounds dressed up in a Cold War architectural style of bureaucratic mono-color (fifty shades of blue, if one may) have been the norm for public food markets in Taiwanese cities, designed to improve hygiene standards and managerial excellence. In researching the regulations on street markets in Taiwan, the archival work leads me to discovering that the Japanese colonial origin of indoor food markets was first designed to be a major tax revenue generating mechanism for the first Colonial Governor, who used the lucrative tax collected at colonial public markets and slaughter houses to fund his ambitious hygiene infrastructure implemented in the early 1900s. This first public, indoor marketplace was established in colonial Tainan in 1905, in a baroque style that even surpassed its Japanese counterparts established as late as the 1930s. In the Cold War era, the Nationalist government continued the colonial governmentality regarding street markets as a source of social chaos and hygiene concerns. Yet the more effort put into rounding up street vendors into indoor market compounds, often from their original neighborhood to far away locations, the more it seemed to be a futile attempt as new vendors would soon appear at the original wet market’s location. And of course, the unruliness of street vendors is a constant story of political tension in Taiwan. The most infamous case was the instigation of the 228 Incident in February1947 — when a 40-year-old woman Lin Jiang-mai, a vendor selling contraband cigarettes at a local street market in Taiheichō, was struck by the Tobacco Monopoly Bureau enforcement team trying to confiscate her cigarettes. Taiheichō was one of the known street market locations in the pre-Japanese Qing era, and it was such a popular designation that later the Japanese Colonial Governor set up an indoor market compound in the old street market’s location in 1908.   

A Vendor in Eirakuchō Market, Taipei. 1930. (Taiwan Memory Data Base, Taiwan National Central Library. https://tm.ncl.edu.tw/. Latest accessed 2022-02-10.)

The Labor History of Wet Market

The labor history of wet markets in Taiwan is even more telling of the biopolitics of food infrastructure. In the anti-eviction activism for a wet market located in central Taipei in 2020-2021, the international friction on wet market embeds itself into the concrete, everyday struggle faced by the vendors and migrants whose lives are deeply entangled in these neighborhood-scale food supply organisms. Situated at the juncture of the old and new in central Taipei, the wet market of my fieldwork site, Shuanglian market, has been caught up in the storm of gentrification enhanced by Taipei municipal government’s zealous pursuit of rebranding Taipei as global city, which resulted in an infrastructure renewal aiming to replace community grassland alongside the wet market of about 200 vendors with a design claimed to be Tokyo “Shinjuku” style of trendiness. This design would cover the already over heated city center with cement surface throughout one subway line’s ground-level park. Initially, the excuse for eviction of the wet market went by branding the vendors an urban safety risk for potentially causing fire in the neighborhood and obstructing fire trucks getting through (an entirely false accusation as the open space of park by the wet market provides plenty of space for emergency evacuation). This excuse uncannily resembled the eradication of the so-called “low-end population” campaign that removed migrant communities in Beijing in 2017-2019.

In participating in the year-long protest launched by Shuanglian’s community members who support the wet market, I found the grassroot organizing among the vendors can surprise our dominant academic discourses regarding these day laborers as the precariat class. Our academic discourses often depict contingent labor in our time as “the dangerous class” who are hard to organize and prone to anti-social resentment. To the contrary, despite all the difficulties of organizing meetings, elections, and petitions among a group of high school dropouts, illiterate elders, Buddhist moms, southeast Asian vendors and neighborhood hooligans against a hoard of techno-bureaucrats and civil engineers from the Taipei Metro and municipal government, the wet market is like a sponge absorbing a variety of invisible livelihoods, providing everyone a place to labor, to connect and make a living. Indeed, after interviewing many vendors, I found a large percentage of them were once factory workers at textile or shoe factories who had been laid off when Taiwanese factories went overseas in droves in the 1990s, to mainland China or southeast Asia. Many vendors initially took up odd jobs and gradually found their way into these organically gathered wet market locations, catering for community-oriented food consumption by providing sophisticated, individualized service for housewives and seniors who frequent their familiar vendors.

What the Taiwan story tells us is that the local wet markets, called caishichang (菜市場) in mandarin, provide a social mechanism to digest the over-commodified factory workers created during the golden era of Taiwan’s manufacture-export in 1960s-1980s, who later were forced into unemployment during the first crisis of rising wages and living standards following the Taiwanese capitalists going overseas to reduce production cost in pursuit of higher profit. These day laborers were nonetheless first created by Taiwan’s “aiding the industry with agriculture (以農養工)” in the 1960s-70s, which forced peasant families to rely on one or more members working at factories, while the island’s special economic zones provided jobs for sewing shoes, making toys, or assembling chemical products for US companies such as Johnson & Johnson. Later, when these manufactures left for cheaper labor in the then opening People’s Republic of China, the workers in Taiwan found themselves falling into a precarious situation. Eventually many found their way into wet markets and night markets, where labor for food preparation arose to cater for the urban white-collar households. Despite the government’s consistent efforts to erase wet markets in major Taiwanese cities, the scale of outdoor food markets simply has continued to swell everywhere in the past twenty years, particularly at the margin of large metropolitan centers or in emerging technology towns such as Taipei and Hsinchu – where major IT companies like the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing reside. The mono-industry path launched in Taiwan in the past 30-40 years has indeed contributed to a flourishing engineer class working for the IT industry, yet this narrow concentration also abandons and leaves behind a generation of workers who were not included in the technology boom. So these workers turn to basic human needs: food and care, the things that every neighborhood needs and desires. It is thus no surprise that about 70% of this union of the vendors working at the Shuanglian market is female. And it is also no surprise for any labor scholar to anticipate that one major obstacle they face is confronting the Taipei municipal government’s initial ignorance and negligence of these vendors’ livelihood, rights to work, and well-being.

There is thus no surprise that wet markets exist in many Asian trade hub cities, for they serve as an organism absorbing surplus population. And this defines the social life of wet markets. The labor history of wet markets also calls for a perspective of multispecies ethnography, for the labor which is involved in the food production processes tends to be placed at the lower rung of the social hierarchy, alongside the produce and animals they deal with. They are categorized and denigrated by having to deal with the bodily fluids of animals, the unavoidable wetness, however much commodity fetishism tries to hide these material realities from the supermarket consumer by deploying ever more plastic packaging. It is thus also imperative to consider the biopolitics of wet markets as a problem of capitalist crisis converging with environmental crisis, particularly in light of Rob Wallace and others’ call to dwell analytically on the constant outbreaks of zoonotic pandemics of our time in the context of human’s increasing depriving wild animal of their habitats for urban expansion and industrial animal farms.

The global friction of wet markets urges us to confront capitalist surplus production and surplus population, articulated in the Marxist theories of crisis, in the increasingly solidified Asian urban household economy that outsources family food preparation and food care to wet markets in metropolitan areas. The laborers who carefully prepare a piece of pork at a pork stall in a wet market absorb a whole history of food infrastructure, and its stigma, in exchange for rising Asian urban consumers demanding freshly slaughtered meat for a dish on the dinner table. If we cannot consider wet markets in the origin outbreak narrative of Covid-19 as inevitably caught up by multispecies labor relations taking place at global trade hubs, against a backdrop of increased inequality embodied in the degradation of public health around the world, we might never see the end of enhanced pandemic cruelty, which defines a new horizon of (in)humanity in our time. 

I-Yi Hsieh is a Postdoctoral Researcher, ICCS, Taiwan Yangming-Chiaotung University 

 

NOTES

[1] See the Sina Finance report on the Huanan Seafood Market’s management team: https://cj.sina.com.cn/articles/view/1704103183/65928d0f02001iyab

[2] Ibid.

Vicente Rafael, Duterte’s Phallus: On the Aesthetics of Authoritarian Vulgarity

Editor’s note: On the eve of the Presidential elections in the Philippines, we asked a few scholars to write about what they perceive to be the stakes. Here is Vicente L. Rafael, History Department, University of Washington, in an excerpt from his newly-published The Sovereign Trickster: Death and Laughter in the Age of Duterte (Duke University Press, 2022)

Obscenity is an integral part of the stylistics of power…The penis [is] a historical phenomenon in its own right. …The [autocrat] thinks and expresses himself through his phallus…Without a phallus, the [autocrat] is nothing, has no fixed identity. Thanks to his phallus, the [autocrat’s] cruelty can stand quite naked: erect.

                                                            –Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 115; 175

One of the ways by which President Rodrigo Duterte had laid claim to both national and global attention is through his stories and jokes. Duterte is widely known for his irreverence and bawdy humor that constitute important elements of his governing style. His stories reveal a reliance on invective and an obsession with obscenity. He also makes frequent references to genitalia–his as well those of his critics to the delight of his listeners. He revels in what Achille Mbembe calls an aesthetic of vulgarity that has the effect of establishing a relationship of “conviviality” between himself and his audience. What results is an “intimate tyranny,” much of it centered on the tales of his phallus as it encounters the world.

For example, in a campaign stop at a large sports complex in Quezon City in 2016, Duterte told a story that reverberated around the world. While he was a mayor of Davao, there occurred a bloody prison siege in Davao City in 1989. Among the dead was one of the hostages taken by the prisoners, a 36-year old Australian missionary, Jacqueline Hamill. According to Duterte, she, along with the other women hostages, was repeatedly raped by the prisoners before being killed. But rather than evoke pathos, the sight of the Hamill’s corpse stirs desire in the mayor:

All the women were raped so during the first assault, because they retreated, the bodies they used as shields, one of them was the corpse of the Australian woman lay minister. Tsk, this was a problem. When the bodies were brought out, they were wrapped. I looked at her face, son of a bitch, she looked like a beautiful American actress. Son of a bitch, what a waste. What came to mind was, they raped her, they took turns. I was angry because she was raped, that’s one thing. But she was so beautiful, the mayor should have gone first. Son of a bitch (putang ina), what a waste (sayang). (in Taglish, my translation)

Hamill’s rape and death is used by Duterte as a set up for a joke about himself, more specifically, about the arousal and frustration of his lust. He sees her dead body and her beautiful face, and he feels that he should’ve been the first in line to assault her. Instead, he comes too late and so isn’t able to come at all. It is his failure to assert his claim on the woman’s body that is presumably taken by his audience as the object of hilarity. Seeing her dead body fills him neither with rage nor grief, but with desire that cannot be fulfilled. He is unable to discharge his authority, as it were. The horror of the scene is thus displaced into a story of about a mayor lamenting the failure of his phallic power. Rather than an erectile victory, the story ends with the punch line, “sayang”, what a pity, preceded by the cuss word, “putang ina.”

But all is not lost. Duterte’s disclosure of desire unfulfilled and phallic authority undercut produces a payback. The audience laughs, and their laughter compensates him for his lost power. It returns to him both the pleasure and authority that dead prisoners and the woman’s corpse had deprived him of. Unable to pull rank, the mayor is nonetheless rewarded with the people’s recognition of his narrative performance. Reports of the story drew sharp rebukes from feminists, human rights advocates, the Australian and US embassy and many other quarters. But among the electorate, his popularity soared. Horrifying his critics but delighting his supporters with his pungent shamelessness, Duterte’s bad language and obscene stories were crucial in propelling him to the presidency.

In tracking his jokes, we can see a set of obsessions built around the question: Who gets to own the phallus? Who gets to wield it and for what purpose? Here, the phallus should be understood less as a biological thing synonymous with the penis as a symbolic weapon for asserting autocratic authority and patriarchal prerogatives over women and men alike. Like guns, cars or wealth, the phallus can be used to impress and to threaten, to unify and disperse, to induce pleasure but also coerce submission. Duterte routinely threatens to castrate his opponents even as he repeatedly asserts? his generous endowment. Used to avenge imagined hurts and shore up a fragile ego, Duterte’s phallus proved effective in shutting down his opposition.

The presidential phallus, however, is far from being an unassailable force. As we saw in the rape story above, it can also be blunted by other men and the woman whose death frustrated Duterte’s assertion of his privileges. Indeed, Duterte is notorious for joking about rape as a way of re-asserting his ability to police women’s behavior and enlist men into affirming the sexism that buttresses his authoritarian imagination. Hence, when critics point out that contrary to his claims, crime in Davao while he was a mayor had gone up, especially rape, he retorts that wherever there are beautiful women, there will be plenty of rape. Along the same lines, he also spoke approvingly of men who had “the balls” to rape candidates for Miss Universe in exchange for facing certain punishment. Women are raped not simply because they are women for Duterte; it is because they are “beautiful.” It is as if their beauty is a challenge that has to be faced down, a provocation that must be put in its proper place, under the rule and in the service of the phallus.

In joking about rape, Duterte upholds patriarchal norms and sexist attitudes by wielding what the philosopher Kate Manne calls the “cudgel” of misogyny. And that cudgel is the phallus, at once “combative” and “anxious,” always wary of challenges and eager to assert itself. One particularly disturbing story that illustrates the coercive role of misogyny involves Duterte encouraging soldiers, when confronted with Communist female fighters, to spare their lives but to shoot them in the vagina: “There’s a new order coming from mayor. We won’t kill you. We will just shoot your vagina. So that…if she has no vagina she would be useless.” Shooting them in their vagina was, in a way, taking away what made them “women.” It was the punishment for taking up arms and defying the State. It amounted to “castrating” those who challenged the patriarchal norms integral to the exercise of its authority. Hence, we see how Duterte’s misogyny is directed not at every woman, but at particular women who attempt to seize the phallus for themselves, daring to go against his political and sexual authority.

One last revealing example of Duterte’s power of storytelling: his tale of being sexually abused at the age of 14 by an American Jesuit priest during confession. He often returns to this story as a way of casting aspersions on the Catholic Church that had been critical of his human rights abuses. Folded into this story, however, is another: his sexual abuse of their household help (which he later confesses was fabricated). Here what we see is a double confession—Duterte to the priest and to the audience–and a double assault: the priest’s on Duterte and Duterte’s on the maid. The two acts of violation turn out to be intimately related whereby the priest’s assault of Duterte becomes a means for the latter’s domination of his audience. He has frequently told these stories on various occasions, usually in a mix of Taglish, Bisaya and English.

Duterte recalls going to Friday confession while a freshman at the elite boys’ school Ateneo de Davao. In vivid detail, he tells of how the priest held on to his genitals as he forced him to tell more stories of his sinfulness. The longer the stories went, the more Duterte found himself captive in the confessional to the desires of the priest. One of these stories involved the young Duterte confessing to molesting his sleeping maid by inserting his finger in her vagina while she was asleep, then proceeding to the bathroom to masturbate not once but twice. Later on, Duterte claimed that the scene with the maid never happened. He made it up under pressure from the priest’s demand for more stories so he could continue molesting him.

Many of Duterte’s stories are arguably confessional to the extent that they are about exposing what usually stays hidden, bringing to light what otherwise remains in darkness. The subject who speaks is also the subject who is spoken about as s/he reveals the history of their sinful acts to a priest who in turn dispenses penance in the name of God. As the mediator of divine forgiveness, the priest exercises an inordinate power over the penitent, registering the penitent’s debts and prescribing the penance with which to cancel these. However, in Duterte’s telling, the very act of confession is subverted. It is no longer meant to seek forgiveness and acknowledge someone else’s authority but precisely to ridicule it. In his oft-told story about his abuse at the hands of Catholic priests as a teenager, Duterte reveals the priest’s concupiscence, showing how confession becomes a vehicle not for forgiveness but for clerical abuse. Confession breeds obscenity rather than divine dispensation, making for an uncanny encounter between priest and penitent. What emerges in the experience of confession for the penitent—here a young boy—is the return of the repressed in familiar form: the predator as father. From the perspective of the boy, the father’s demands appear autocratic. He cannot be refused. His lust for the boy requires that the latter must stay longer in the confessional, making up sins in order to satisfy the priest.

To comply with the priest’s demands, Duterte makes up a story about “fingering” their housemaid, then masturbating in the bathroom. He evokes a circle of touching: while the priest fondles his genitals, Duterte talks about foisting himself on the genitals of the woman as she sleeps, then subsequently fondling himself. His story connects these improper connections into a sequence of submission and mastery that yields pleasure and laughter. The trauma of sexual abuse for Duterte at the hands of the priest is transmuted into the excitement of probing the maid’s genitals then mastering, as it were, his own. In the end, the priest waves him off with a few feckless prayers, assuring him of eternal damnation. Rather than a site for the contrition and divine forgiveness, confession here is converted into a kind of pornographic machine for the reproduction of sadistic male pleasures. Duterte’s exposure and disempowerment by someone above become the conditions for overpowering someone below. He thus reverses his position from being abused to being the abuser, from a position of submission to one of domination, from one of fear to one of satisfaction and release. But only at the expense and through the exploitation of a subordinate other.

And what of his audience? Feminists, human rights advocates, the Church hierarchy and other critics of Duterte reacted with anger. They decried his misogyny at making light of sexual abuse as consistent with his disregard for human rights. Others were scandalized by his “indecency” and filthy language, his lack of “delicadeza,” or civilized behavior. In other words, they read Duterte’s obscenity in the way that he had meant it: as an unremitting war on social conventions.

Judging from the transcripts and the videos, however, those who were present at his speeches reacted differently. They applauded his stories and laughed at his jokes. Why? Freud once posed this question. When we laugh at jokes, what are we laughing at? Are we responding to the technique of joke-telling or to the content of the joke, or to both? It is never clear, he says, to the extent that jokes, like dreams, are fulfillments of the same wish: to evade repression. The political significance of jokes, the fact that they go against the grain of the reasonable and the normal, would seem to make them valuable resources for the oppressed seeking to overthrow the weight of authority. Mikhail Bakhtin further argues that medieval celebrations like the carnival and modern literary forms like the novel were sites for this upending of hierarchy through satire, disguise and social inversions. The high is brought down low and the low is elevated, especially parts of the body and its functions.

Bribing his audience, Duterte is like a smuggler of illicit goods, promising forbidden pleasures and overturning repressive strictures. He says what they would’ve have wanted to say but could not. Their laughter could thus be read as a sign of their identification with Duterte’s efforts to find a way out of his suffering at the hands of the priest with a tale about abusing the maid who nonetheless remains unaware of her violation. They delight in his resistance and at his bumbling attempts at mastery that leads to some sort of self-recovery. Decades later when he tells this story, he is no longer a boy but the president of the country. Occupying the heights of power, he is capable of commanding attention wherever he goes with whatever he says. Duterte’s obscenities feel subversive, but subversion in this context is in the service of an autocratic end where laughter produces an intimacy between ruler and ruled. The vulgarity of his language positions him as a kind of rebel inviting others to join him in his assault on bourgeois sensibilities and norms. But it comes with the condition that the audience must submit to his narrative. Only he can tell the stories and expect their laughter. The reverse is never possible as no one, as far as I know, jokes with Duterte in public. He expects no narrative reciprocity, no return with interest, but only a kind of passive acceptance of the surplus of stories he gives you. There is thus nothing democratic in Duterte’s humor. Instead, the pleasure that the audience gets from his jokes is intrinsically linked to their willingness to participate in the imaginative violation of others, especially women. Whether he seeks revenge or release, Duterte’s tales seek to assert his phallic power over his enemies while simultaneously subordinating and overpowering his audience.

In looking at the narrative structure of his jokes, we see how it hinges not only on classic techniques of joke-telling—those of condensation and displacement, as in dreams. It is also productive of a hierarchy of listening whereby Duterte as the teller monopolizes the time and the language of telling. As part of the audience, you have no choice but to wait for him—and he is always late—then listen to him take his time unspooling his tales. Unable to leave without drawing his ire, you remain a captive audience. Jokes then become a way of establishing his authority. He exposes himself, renders himself vulnerable and risks dissolving his authority, but only to recover and re-assert his mastery over the scene of exposure. This dialectic of disclosure and domination allows him to forge a tyranny of intimacy, extracting your consent registered by your laughter. Humor is thus a means of playing out his anxiety while assuaging his fear. Vulgarity is stylized and obscenity performed to release the audience’s inhibitions at defying conventions. But this defiance is bogus and deeply conservative since it always comes with the price of submission to Duterte’s authoritarian imagination.

While laughter creates conviviality and community, it is always shadowed by violence and fear. Duterte recreates in every story something of the tone and texture of his primal scene: the dark confessional where he is held captive by the hands of the American priest. Indeed, his performative shamelessness today may be read the unfinished struggle to master his fear of the father-predator as he attempts to take on the latter’s power for himself. It is precisely that same phallic power that he seeks to grasp and wield when he addresses those he considers critical of him such as women and “lesser” men, and especially abject figures of criminality like drug dealers and users. Recklessly cussing at them, he lusts after their deaths, brooking neither dissent nor opposition.

Billy Beswick, What Still Flashes Up: Anti-Imperialist Legacies and The Battle of Lake Changjin

Resist America, Aid Korea! 抗美援朝! Goals the grey suits of Hollywood might have inadvertently championed in 2019, when the South Korean anti-capitalist blockbuster Parasite took home four of the top prizes at the Academy Awards, including the Best Picture and Best Director Oscars. Anti-capitalist blockbuster is of course a contradiction in terms, but then contradiction has been at the heart of anti-capitalist struggle since capitalism itself was struggling into existence. When the Japan-based, pro-Pyongyang Korean-language newspaper Choson Sinbo praised Parasite for revealing the true nature of class relations in the ROK following the film’s historic Oscar sweep, the laughably reductionist logics of “enemy x enemy = friend” swam clear into view.[1] Did resistance to the global economic order underpinned by US power put Parasite’s director, Bong Joon-ho, on the side of Kim Jong-un? Could we therefore argue that, in the messy interstices of our international political unconscious, the men and women of the near century-old Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences were, like the citizens of the brand-new People’s Republic of China in the early 1950s, mobilised by that famous rallying cry of anti-imperialism: Resist America, Aid (North) Korea?

The obvious and correct answer –– of course not –– obscures important lessons. These have to do with the ambivalent legacies of socialism and anti-imperialism. The Korean War film The Battle at Lake Changjin, commissioned by the government to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party and released internationally last month (it was released in China on September 30th, on the eve of National Day), gives a good picture of the kinds of ideological work to which these legacies are being put in the contemporary PRC. One can pick out three distinct, though overlapping messages: 1) The revolution was waged in the past to secure peace and stability in the present. 2) China acts only in self-defense against imperialist aggression. 3) The nation demands and commands respect on the world stage. Unpacking how such messages are constructed in the film makes it possible to track alternative, occluded readings. We might thereby find, to lean heavily on the language of Walter Benjamin, some pattern in the wreckage piled at the Angel of History’s feet that can be blasted out of the past and used to orientate us towards a more just future.[2] Doing so doesn’t make the suggestion that Bong and the ladies and gentlemen of the Academy were on the side of the DPRK any less laughable, but it does change what the joke is. Ridicule gives way to the gentle irony at the foundation of any uneasy but necessary alliance –– here, an alliance with the hope embedded in historical actions that does not turn a blind eye to their (frequently violent and counterproductive) real-world effects.

Co-directed by Chen Kaige (foremost among the PRC’s so-called fifth generation of filmmakers) and Hong Kong martial arts and action film directors Tsui Hark and Dante Lam, Lake Changjin opens with a PLA company commander, Wu Qianli, returning to his native village. Played by the imperiously handsome Wu Jing, Qianli’s glorious homecoming in the wake of the nation’s liberation is tempered by the fact that he arrives at his parents’ houseboat carrying his older brother’s ashes. From these ashes, however, as the audience quickly comes to see, rise the promise of a future free from the volatile oscillations of fortune that have characterized the Wu family’s life up until now. The houseboat stands for their rootless, transitory existence, and Qianli promises that, with peace finally secured, he will build them a house on solid ground. Before construction can begin on this metonym for New China, however, he is called away to defend the nation’s borders from the encroaching threat of the United States army, which has just crossed the 38th parallel and is advancing towards the Yalu River. Cut to a meeting in Beijing, where Mao Zedong’s thoughts on the crisis are offered: “Considering only the present, I don’t want to fight this war, but for the sake of the future, for the sake of the peaceful development of the country over the next decades, over the next century, we cannot but fight.” Many more comments like this are made, which emphasize present sacrifice for the sake of the future. That future is now, and the peace to which the audience are being referred is the Pax Communistica of China’s present. (Ying Zhu pointed out in a recent talk based on research from her upcoming book, Hollywood in China: Behind the Scenes of the World’s Largest Movie Market, that less than 1% of the total profits for PRC-produced commercial films comes from overseas. The audience for the film is therefore clearly domestic, though the participation of two heavyweight Hong Kong directors indexes a desire to draw the boundaries of the “domestic” more widely.)

The international context that the film foregrounds ensures a neat division between disturbers and keepers of the peace. This allows for what Wang Hui would call a “depoliticized” picture of the revolution,[3] one in which the role of the CCP in radically transforming the basic structures of society is underplayed in favor of a view of the Party as guarantor of stability for a historically beleaguered people. Throughout the film, as characters met their grisly fates in the mountains of North Korea, Gong Li’s voice rang in my mind. Her character’s refrain to her husband in Zhang Yimou’s To Live seemed apposite to these soldiers and their loved ones: “I just want to live a peaceful life with you.” But what keeps the couple in Zhang’s film from a peaceful life is not imperialist aggression, it is the utopic experiments of the new regime, causing oscillations in fortune as severe as those from which the nation’s liberation promises to free the Wu family. While To Liveis hardly sympathetic to the revolution –– it ends with a sigh of relief as the nation leaves behind the Maoist past for the ostensible stability of the reform era –– its negative portrayal puts the radicalness of the communist experiment center stage.

Lake Changjin makes only one fleeting reference to land reform, when it is reported that a soldier decided to enlist in the army out of gratitude to the new regime for the land apportioned to his parents. But even this moment places revolution in the past, so that any sense that there is something for which to struggle domestically is completely sublated into a battle for metaphysical sovereignty, untethered from materialist concerns about what, precisely, makes sovereignty worth fighting for in the first place. The Civil War in this telling becomes merely a war to unify the country, not a battle between alternative conceptions of how a just society should be organized. Anti-imperialism is presented therefore not as resistance to the highest stage of capitalism, but as a defense of territorial integrity for its own sake. When an intelligence report mentions General MacArthur visiting Taiwan, and the US Seventh Fleet occupying the Taiwan Strait, there is no mention of the KMT. Eliding the fact that the PLA fought a bloody Civil War not merely to unify the country, but to resist the nation’s incorporation into an unjust economic system, Lake Changjin is able to portray the War to Resist America and Aid Korea as a showdown between white US and Han-Chinese troops. No Koreans appear in the film, and so aiding fellow socialist nation builders drops out of the picture. Resistance becomes all. The way this works is worth pausing over, for it points not only to the priorities of the film but the psychoanalytic logics that underlined PRC history from the very beginning.

When the leaders of the CCP decided that they would not grant minority nationality areas the status of republics within a broader federation –– as the Soviet Union had done –– the reason provided was the need to resist imperialist aggression. As Zhou Enlai’s stated on 7th September 1949:

We advocate national self-rule, but we must prevent imperialists utilizing the nationality question to drive a wedge in the unification of China. For instance, the British imperialist conspiracy in southern Xinjiang and Tibet, and the US imperialist conspiracy on the islands of Taiwan and Hainan.[4]

Concurrent with China’s entry into the Korean War in October 1950, the PLA crossed the Jinsha River and entered Chamdo, in Eastern Tibet.[5] That the PRC was waging a war of anti-imperialist defense at the same time as it was annexing an arguably de facto sovereign nation could, in unsympathetic hands, be used to paint the entire project of liberation as nothing more than a veneer overlaying a Nietzschean will to power. But as the Zhou Enlai quote above makes clear, the same principle of resistance underlay China’s decision to cross both the Yalu and Jinsha Rivers.

This is not meant as an excuse, rather it is an attempt to draw attention to the way resistance works doubly as a motivator for justice and injustice alike. Jacqueline Rose writes that while “in political vocabularies, resistance is the passage to freedom, for psychoanalysis it is repetition, blockage, blind obeisance to crushing internal constraint.”[6] Resistance is not a cover, but a blinker, obscuring the truth of one’s actions from view. What commentators frequently refer to as the “Orwellian” language used to describe the takeover of Tibet –– “peaceful liberation” –– is not unique to the CCP, as the official name for the War on Terror –– “Operation Enduring Freedom” –– makes clear. Both examples point to the way resistance can make imperialist activity possible. The line where self-defense tips over into aggression is murky, and language works to soothe the psyche of a nation that has overstepped the mark.

In an interesting, if historically debatable, article written in response to the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, Wang Hui points to depoliticization as foundational to the growing strength of identity movements that challenge the PRC’s territorial claims. He cites the importance of land reform in Tibet, which he acknowledged was implemented “violently” and “from the top down”, for cementing the legitimacy of the regime among the peasant population.[7] How seriously the Tibetan peasantry could be said to have accepted CCP rule is the moot point here (statistics are obviously hard to come by, but those refugees that have made their way over the border into India since the Dalai Lama fled in 1959 are not all one-time aristocrats). What is undeniable is that any sense that the liberation of Tibet was geared to some larger vision of justice has been jettisoned for a focus on Tibet’s metaphysical status as a part of China. Such a depoliticized approach to the nationality question was there right from the very beginning; Zhou Enlai says in the above quoted speech that Hainan, Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang “were always within Chinese territory.”[8] But this position once comingled with a sense that the PRC as a state formation would bring about freedom, equality, and democracy for all those under its jurisdiction. These words are still plastered on walls all over the China mainland. Thinking of them as mere Orwellian ruses is to deny them of their power. Lies enjoin no responsibility on their speakers. The same is not true for promises unkept.

Dai Jinhua writes eloquently of the communist legacy as a promise:

the significance of Marxism for social practice is that it promises a form of future justice…Only this can give meaning to past and present victims. For me, this includes the victims and sacrifices of twentieth-century communist movements.[9]

There is something strikingly Benjaminian about this commitment to redeeming the past through present day political action. And this is something that Lake Changjin itself aims to do, in the final moments of the film, when US troops are shown saluting a battalion of dead Chinese snipers, frozen into their positions and covered over with a thin layer of snow. Imperialist regard for the indominable will of the Chinese people seems, in the last analysis, to have been what the war was fought to win. The film thereby suggests that redemption of this past sacrifice requires one to continue to insist on China’s strength, and demand respect for it. This can be linked with depoliticization, and specifically with what Nancy Fraser has analyzed as the general postsocialist shift away from demands for material redistribution and towards demands for recognition.[10] Recognition was always a part of the PRC’s enterprise (hence Mao’s description of the nation’s founding as the moment when its supine and humiliated citizens finally stood up), but to cast the entire communist project as a demand only for the recognition of a particular ethno-national group is no way to do justice to either its martyrs or its victims. 

Pointing to the way Parasite’s anti-capitalist sentiments pull it and its viewers into an alliance with the PRC’s struggle against imperialism in the Korean War is therefore more than a joke. It highlights the fact that a legacy of the war, besides that which underpins ethno-nationalist demands for respect and territorial integrity, remains alive. The hope for a more just future, one which imagines a world built on needs and priorities besides those of capital, still flashes up.  Another example of this is Tibetan director Pema Tseden’s 2015 film Tharlo, which opens with the titular character, a Tibetan herder, reciting the words to Mao’s “Serve the People.” It ends with him setting himself aflame as he comes to see that this is a promise that the state has no interest in keeping. Yet the film is far from hopeless. The Maoist reference throngs silently throughout the film, including in its closing moments. Tharlo’s tragedy is a photographic negative of the possibility that the promise might one day be fulfilled, that the past might still be redeemed.

Billy Beswick is a doctoral student at the University of Oxford, where his research is focussed on the relationship between national imaginaries and minority ethnic self-representation in film, art and literature from the PRC and Taiwan.

Notes

[1] “Pro-North Korea daily praises Oscar-winning ‘Parasite’ for ‘exposing’ South Korea’s reality,” Reuters, February 21, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-awards-oscar-parasite-northkorea-idUKKBN20F1CU.

[2] Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (London: The Bodley Head, 2015), 245-255.

[3] See Wang Hui, The End of the Revolution: China and the Limits of Modernity (London and New York: Verso, 2009).

[4] Zhou Enlai 周恩來, “Several Questions Relating to the People’s Political Consultative Conference” 關於人民政協的幾個問題. In A Selection of Documents Relating to the Nationality Question: July 1921 –– September 1949民族問題文獻匯編: 一九二一 · 七 –––– 一九四九 · 九, edited by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 中共中央統戰部, 1265-1267  (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), 1267.

[5] That is, the eastern part of the present day Tibetan Autonomous Region; Chamdo is in the west of the historical Tibetan region of Kham.

[6] Jacqueline Rose, The Last Resistance (London: Verso, 2017), 21.

[7] Wang Hui 汪暉, “The Taiwan Question in the Great Historical Upheaval of Contemporary China” 當代中國歷史巨變中的台灣問題, Culture and Society 人文與社會, 2015 (http://wen.org.cn/modules/article/view.article.php?4172/c8).

[8] Zhou, “Several Questions”, 1267.

[9] Dai Jinhua, After the Post-Cold War: The Future of Chinese History, edited by Lisa Rofel (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2018), 21.

[10] Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist” Condition (New York and London: Routledge, 1997), 2.

Flair Donglai Shi, “Yellow Miracle:” Su Bingtian and the Dilemma of Collective Racial Imagination

The 2020 Tokyo Olympics, which closed on the 8th of August 2021 after the many delays and disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, was a great success for Team China. Having bagged 88 medals, including 38 gold medals, mainland Chinese athletes achieved a new record in terms of their collective performance at Summer Olympic Games held overseas. However, one of the most celebrated and memorable moments for Chinese audiences had nothing to do with medalists. 

It occurred when sprinter Su Bingtian finished with a new personal-best record of 9.83 seconds in the men’s 100m semi-finals on the 1st of August. Only the second athlete from Asia ever to qualify for the finals in this event (after Takayoshi Yoshioka at the 1932 Summer Olympics), Su achieved sixth place, in the end, with another impressive result of 9.98 seconds. The number 9.83 set the entire Chinese nation on fire because it was not only Su’s personal best but also the best result ever achieved by a Chinese man, a man of Asian descent, or a man from what many Chinese still call “the yellow race.” Overnight, a sense of collective, racialized pride began to permeate public articles as well as private conversations, exemplified in phrases like “Yellow Miracle,” “Yellow Pride,” “Fastest Yellow Man,” “Asian Record,” and “China Speed,” which inundated Chinese social media feeds. The core message was clear: the fastest “Asian,” the most outstanding athlete of the “yellow race” in a sport long dominated by other races, is from China, and that is a fact of great historical significance.

Race as a human category, defined by biological and physical features, is in most fields regarded as more or less outdated and has been replaced by interpretations of race as a sociocultural construct. Competitive sports, however, remain one of the fields of concentrated public interest still highly conducive to essentialist conceptualizations of race. The segregationist practice of “racial stacking,” namely assigning players to different positions according to the perceived strengths of their racial and ethnic backgrounds, is often replicated on the discursive level in terms of how certain racial groups are thought to have genetic advantages over others in different sports. For example, within the US, the overrepresentation of African American players in basketball reinforces the sociocultural myth of “black athletic superiority.” Such essentialist thinking, perpetuated by popular books like Jon Entine’s Taboo: Why Black Athletes Dominate Sports and Why We Are Afraid to Talk about It (2000), is far from sufficiently problematized in public discourses due to the seemingly positive connotations associated with such racial imaginaries.

Those imaginaries persist despite the numerous myth-busting articles that point out how environmental and socioeconomic factorsoutweigh genetics in longitudinal evaluations of athletic performances. (It is worth noting that in the field of genetics itself, “race” is a null concept, considered to be of very limited use if useful at all.) Racialized tropes in sports also persist despite evidence of the detrimental effects such myths have on African American athletes, especially how their individual hard work is often dismissed in the name of race and how African American children still have limited accesses to a more diverse range of sport activities, facilities, and training due to their disadvantaged socioeconomic position. The myth of race persists despite the fact that it reinforces the racist logic that underlies notions such as “Asian brain” versus “Black brawn.” Such racial binaries negatively affect athletes because, if the overrepresentation of African Americans in certain sports is justified by race and genetics, then the continued underrepresentation and exclusion of Asian American players in the same sports can be ignored as somehow reasonable and acceptable as well. Moreover, as competitive sports are also charged with imaginaries of desirable masculinities, the “black athletic superiority” myth sustains the racial-sexual axis of contemporary American society, where media representations fetishize black men as hypersexual while consistently desexualizing Asian men.

A similar version of the same myth also exists in China, and common belief in the importance of the “racial factor” in international sports informed the collective significance that Chinese people saw in Su Bingtian’s success. In Chinese media and everyday conversations alike, it is not uncommon to hear assertions about the racial advantages that Chinese athletes “naturally” enjoy in sports that draw upon “agility and technique,” such as diving, badminton, and table tennis. As for the recent successes in weightlifting achieved by East Asian athletes, one theory purports that this can be explained by the fact that East Asians have shorter arms compared to other races. The biological determinism underpinning these racial discourses also means that whenever a Chinese athlete delivers a record-breaking performance in a sport deemed “unsuited” or “disadvantageous” for East Asians, such as the various events in track and field, he or she is bound to receive extra praise for surpassing the “racial limit” of that particular sport.

National excitement for Su did not emerge in 2021. In 2015, at the Prefontaine Classic in Eugene, Oregon, he had already generated a buzz in China for clocking a historic 9.99 seconds in the 100m competition, which made him the first Asian to have overcome the 10-second barrier hitherto deemed insurmountable for Asian athletes. Prior to 2015, the category of “Asian” in discussions of the 100m race was already racialized but in ways that did not straightforwardly correspond to geo-national designations. The first “Asian” sprinter to break the 10-second barrier was the Nigerian-born Femi Ogunode, who represented Qatar at the 2014 Asian Games. Although representing a country deemed to be part of “Asia” for the purposes of the Asian Games, Ogunode was not viewed as a “real Asian,” precisely because competitive sports are conceptualized as not only international, but often as tacitly inter-racial, competition. Even if Ogunode were of Arab descent, his record would still occupy a peripherical position in both the global Anglophone and Sinophone imaginations of “Asian” athletes. Like the identity label “Asian American,” the labels “Asian” and its Chinese equivalent “yazhouren,” are typically used to refer to East Asians, and at times South Asians (mostly in the UK, Southern Africa, and North America).

The celebratory conflation of “China Speed,” “Asian Record,” and “Yellow Miracle” reinforce the collective view of the Olympic Games as the biggest of the interracial competitions conducted in the name of nation states. The otherwise progressive (self-)representations of the multiracial, multiethnic, and multicultural compositions of many of these nation states do not contradict the highly racialized lens through which sporting events are viewed. But rather, they reiterate the entrenched perceptions of racial difference internal to the nation building process. The athletic exceptionalism that makes Su representative of some imaginary “yellow race” is based on the essentialist differences that are perceived to exist between the “yellow,” “white,” and “black” races in the popular Chinese imagination. Notably, the hashtag “Su Bingtian surpassed all white men” soon became popular on the social media site weibo after the Chinese sprinter, now fondly dubbed “Sushen (God Su),” qualified for the final on the 1st of August. Media reports were also quick to note that Su would be the only non-black athlete to compete in the final match and highlighted this racial exceptionality with much national pride and excitement.

The collective affect of racial pride, generated by Su’s record-breaking performance, is inherently paradoxical. On the one hand, by celebrating the fact that a yellow man can indeed beat all white men in a sport that has hitherto rendered Asian men unsuitable and thus invisible due to their race, Chinese commentators seem to have proven the irrelevance of race as a categorical force in international sports. On the other hand, by emphasizing the fact that Su was the only non-black athlete to compete in the final race, the myth of “black athletic superiority” was once again taken for granted, resulting in the persistent, tacit dismissal of the hard work of athletes of African heritage in the popular Chinese racial imagination.

Apart from this persistent racial stereotyping of black athletes, the widespread excitement about Su Bingtian’s achievements as a “yellow” man also exposes a certain discursive dilemma in the collective racial imagination and self-identification within China. As scholars like Michael Keevak and Yinghong Cheng have pointed out, “yellow” as an arbitrary racial label was an invention of 19th century European pseudo-sciences, especially racial taxonomy and physical anthropology. Perceived as a sickly and menacing color, “yellow” was assigned to the so-called “Mongoloid” or “Mongolian race,” evoking long-standing European fears and traumas about invasions from the East. The colonialist and racist histories of these terms explain why “yellow” is rendered obsolete and offensive in most Western public discourses; almost all the common phrases associating yellowness with race are negative, such as “Yellow Peril,” “Yellowface,” and “Yellow Fever.”

Many Chinese scholars have also noted this negativity and called for Chinese athletes to stop using the term “huangzhongren (yellow man)” for self-identification. But such efforts have had little to no effect on the popularity of yellowness in Chinese discourses regarding international sports. This is because yellowness as a collective racial identity also has a long history of localization in China and was embedded in the nation’s initial modernization process, which took place in the early 20th century. While “Mongolian” was not accepted as a self-identifier by most Chinese, as the term named only one, specific ethnicity among the many ethnic groups living in China, “yellow” was enthusiastically embraced by many late-Qing officials and early Republican intellectuals like Chen Tianhua, Zou Rong, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Sun Yat-sen, and Pan Guangdan. “Yellow” as a racial color got a lackluster reception in Japan, but in China, yellowness was immediately linked to its long and auspicious role in traditional Chinese culture, as in “the Yellow Emperor,” “Yellow Plateau,” and “Yellow River.” Its older, positive associations help explain why in China today, identifying as “yellow” is not only politically correct but also signifies a unique form of regionalism that seems to transcend national boundaries but at the same time serves to reinforce a Sinocentric view of East Asia.

Contemporary imaginations of yellowness in China perpetuate the simplistic constructions of the global racial hierarchy that early modern Chinese intellectuals adopted from 19th century European thought. That hierarchy puts “white” at the top and “black” at the bottom, with “yellow” and all the “other colored” races in between. The idea of a “white-yellow race war,” imagined by Liang Qichao more than a century ago, persists through a kind of developmentalist competition, wherein Su Bingtian beating all the white athletes in the Olympic semi-finals constitutes but one manifestation of this updated and more abstract version of a race war. The persistence of the hierarchy also sustains the view of blackness and Africanness as animalistic and backward, thus rendering nearly impossible the idea that a “yellow man” might beat a black athlete in a physical sport like sprinting. Nevertheless, Chinese audiences remain eagerly hopeful that such a “yellow miracle” might occur in the years to come. To paraphrase Franz Fanon, if the “yellow” man loses, it is because of his race; if he wins, it is in spite of his race. Either way, he is locked into the infernal circle.

Notably, in the English language, the concepts “white,” “black,” and to a lesser degree “brown,” have all been retained, and are often used as self-identifiers, in public discourses to discuss interracial relations. The political incorrectness of the term “yellow,” and the lack of a concise, inclusive, and racially conscious replacement, can mean that East Asians and those of East Asian descent living outside the region can sometimes feel that they have been denied a similar opportunity to participate in discussions of racism in the more straightforward way that is afforded by such simplistic but powerful “color” categories. At the same time, the racial nationalism channeled through a Sinocentric view of representative yellowness has only been intensifying in the context of rising geopolitical tensions between China and the US in the last decade, and Su’s racial iconicity certainly appears as Liu Xiang redux for many Chinese and China watchers.

While it is easy to deconstruct “yellow” as a historical myth of racist origin and discriminatory function, it is a lot more difficult to find a way to build a strategic collective identity for East Asians based on shared memories and experiences of white supremacy and anti-racist resistance. The complicated discursive life of “yellowness” highlights the tensions between the epistemic violence of racial invisibility in the English language and the uncritical advocacy of racial nationalism in the Chinese language. These tensions, exposed by Su Bingtian’s Olympic success, are likely to remain unresolved and to emerge once again when the next “yellow miracle” comes along.

 

(An earlier, shorter version of this article has been published by Sixth Tone, and I thank the dedicated staff there for their editorial work and for allowing me to publish the full version here.)

Flair Donglai SHI is a researcher in comparative literature, focusing on the “Yellow Peril,” world literature, and China-Africa cultural relations.